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Volume 40 Summer 1975 Number 3
A SURVEY AND EVALUATION OF
COMPETING CHOICE-OF-LAW




Sweeping changes and acrimonious debate were the order of the
day in the choice-of-law field during the years of the sixties and
early seventies. Two salient trends stand out: There was widespread
rejection of traditional choice-of-law thinking and there was a rag-
ing debate over the conflicting theories offered as replacements for
traditional thinking. Although it has been asserted that the choice-
of-law doctrines of the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws were
never deeply fixed in our case law,' it is nevertheless true that the
first Restatement was for many years the most influential statement
of traditional methodology. In 1963, Professor Brainerd Currie con-
cluded that the battle against the first Restatement had been won.
He said that the first Restatement had been renounced by the
American Law Institute and that no responsible scholar was willing
to defend it.2 These years also witnessed widespread abandonment
of traditional choice-of-law concepts by the courts. The most drastic
changes came in the tort choice-of-law cases where state after state
overturned or modified the lex loci delicti rule.'
* James S. Rollins Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; B.A., Hendrix
College, 1956; J.D., Duke University, 1959; LL.M., Georgetown, 1965.
1. D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 12 (1965); Ehrenzweig, A Counter-
Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARv. L. Rev. 377, 379 (1966).
2. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTENI'. PROB. 754 (1963).
3. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alas. 1968); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz.
562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967);
Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966); Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268,
132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Schneider v. Nichols,
280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968);
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Although there was widespread rejection of old concepts,4 one
is hard pressed to find anything approaching a consensus on new
concepts to take their place.- The judge, practitoner, or law student
who attempts to survey scholarly thinking in the conflicts field must
surely come away from his reading with the impression that the law
review articles outnumber the significant cases and that these arti-
cles were written by members of countless contending factions, each
convinced that it has the only sensible solution to choice-of-law
problems.'
Although scholars indicate clearly and often rather testily the
basis of their disagreements, the courts which have rejected tradi-
tional rules often write opinions which mean all things to all people.
New York, one of the first states to break away from the traditional
approach, has, according to the authors of a leading conflicts case-
book, "hopped frenetically from one theory to another like an over-
heated jumping bean."' The typical judicial opinion which rejects
traditional learning does not endorse and consistently rely upon a
particular methodology. Instead, the tendency is to combine a refer-
ence to significant contacts or relationships-the nomenclature of
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws-with a discussion of
the policy considerations which the court considers relevant.' The
courts' use of terminology and techniques from competing method-
ologies-what some commentators have aptly described as eclecti-
cism-has enabled scholars of diverse points of view to unite in
their praise of some decisions."0 While praising specific decisions,
Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. En Banc 1969); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222
A.2d 205 (1966); Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967); Issendorfv. Olson, 194
N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1972); Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight, Inc., 25 Ohio St. 2d 193, 267 N.E.2d
405, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971); Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'r Co., 247 Ore. 274,
428 P.2d 898 (1967); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964);
Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917, petition for cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 957
(1968).
4. Dean Erwin Griswold was a notable exception. See the opinion summarizing his
views in CAVERS, supra note 1, at 20-24.
5. See, e.g., Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, a Recent Development in Conflict of
Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1212 (1963); Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
551 (1968); Symposium on the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, 72 COLUM. L. REv.
219 (1972); Symposium on Cipolla v. Shaposka - An Application of "Interest Analysis," 9
DUQUESNE L. REV. 347 (1971).
6. Id.
7. R. CRAMTON & D. CURRIE, CONFLICT OF LAws 258-59 (1968).
8. Id. at 256.
9. Id. at 257; Juenger, Choice of Law in Interstate Torts, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 202, 204
(1969).
10. R. CRANITON & D. CURRIE, supra note 7, at 257.
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scholars often indicate that there is a need to tie a series of cases
together by use of a more coherent methodology. Yet there is much
to be said in behalf of the tendency to pick and choose from among
competing approaches in fashioning a solution to a particular
choice-of-law problem. Eclecticism may be a strength rather than
a weakness.
These developments have generated a sharp counterreaction in
some quarters." Professor Rosenberg has asserted that the bar and
lower courts were flabbergasted by the famous case of Babcock v.
Jackson." Ridgeway K. Foley, Jr. has argued that in many tort cases
one will not know the applicable law with any assurance until the
case has been decided by the state supreme court."3 Professor Juen-
ger has suggested that the undue time expended in using the new
methodologies and the lack of guidance provided by judicial opin-
ions which espouse them has resulted in a situation in which "...
the parties pay more for 'flexibility' than they used to pay for rigid-
ity."'" In discussing the Restatement (Second), John P. Frank has
pointed out that the multiplication of decision points in a case
inevitably increases the burden on courts. 5 Professor Rosenberg, an
outstanding scholar himself, has suggested that scholars must share
some of the blame for what has become an unhappy state of affairs:
Scholars, in their fascination with conflicts, should not forget that
the game is not being played so they can flex their jurisprudential
muscles, but in order to better the human condition through law."
The reaction of scholars to the thrust and counterthrust of the
contemporary debate varies according to the point of view of the
writer and whether he is defending himself from attack, taking the
offensive, or seeking to explain what the tumult is all about. In
response to charges that the new functional, state-interest method-
ologies are unduly complex, it has been asserted that this is simply
11. See, e.g., Foley, Fragmentation in the Conflict of Laws, 47 ORE. L. REy. 377 (1968);
LaBrum, The Fruits of Babcock and Seider: Injustice, Uncertainty and Forum Shopping, 54
A.B.A.J. 747 (1968); Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson: An Opinion for the New
York Court of Appeals, 67 COLU M. L. REv. 459 (1967); Rosenberg, in Symposium on the Value
of Principled Preferences, 49 Tx. L. Rav. 211, 229 (1971).
12. Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson: An Opinion for the New York Court
of Appeals, 67 COLum. L. REv. 459, 460 (1967). The citation to the Babcock case is 12 N.Y.2d
473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
13. Foley, supra note 11, at 386.
14. Juenger, supra note 9, at 217.
15. J. FRANK, AMERICAN LAW: THE CASE FOR RADIcAL REFORI 95-105 (1969).
16. Rosenberg, in Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 641, 644 (1968).
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not true." Implicit in such answers to criticism is the suggestion
that the critics do not fully understand the new methodology or that
the criticism is motivated by an unwillingness or inability to discard
old ways of thinking about choice-of-law problems. Another reaction
one finds in the literature is a concession that the present situation
is less than satisfactory, coupled with a suggestion that the choice-
of-law field is in a transitional phase and that the problems will
gradually be brought under control." Some of those who hold this
view believe that the difficulties in choice-of-law are caused primar-
ily by the youth and fluidity of the subject.19 One could also point
to the vacuum created by the demise of the first Restatement as the
primary cause. Still others seem to believe that the transition will
be completed and the major problems solved when everyone is fi-
nally persuaded to adopt one particular methodology."
An underlying assumption in much of the writing on choice-of-
law is that we will gradually perfect our methodologies or our under-
standing of the subject and eventually arrive at a "fail-safe" sys-
tem.' Yet absent fundamental changes in our federal system, we
will achieve only partial solutions, and any consensus we may
achieve will be temporary. The promise of an ultimate solution will
only raise false expectations. To be blunt about it, choice-of-law
problems are and will continue to be unmitigated nuisances for the
judge and practitioner. At the same time, these problems are and
will continue to be a source of fascination for the scholar because of
the very complexity and intractability that make them a source of
discomfort for the bench and bar. The most important causes of this
state of affairs are not the youth of the subject, the fascination of
scholars with complexity, or the refusal by too many judges and
lawyers to rid themselves of outmoded patterns of thought. The
basic causes, which will be examined later, are more fundamental
than any of these. This is not, however, a counsel of despair. Al-
though the resources of jurisprudence may not be adequate to pro-
duce a completely satisfactory methodology, it is possible to decide
17. Weintraub, John P. Frank's Criticisms of Recent Developments in Conflict of Laws,
47 TEx. L. REV. 977, 978 (1969).
18. Cheatham and Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 45 CoLUlM. L. REV. 959 (1952);
Hancock, Torts Problems in Conflict of Laws Resolved by Statutory Construction: The Hal-
ley and Other Older Cases Revisited, 18 U. TORONTO L.J. 331, 350 (1968); Reese, Conflict of
Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 679, 680 (1963).
19. Cheatham and Reese, supra note 18, at 959.
20. Hancock, supra note 18, at 350.
21. The term "fail-safe" was taken from Nadelmann, Marginal Remarks on the New
Trends in American Conflicts Law, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 860 (1963).
[Vol. 40
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cases in an informed manner while developing choice-of-law princi-
ples which take account of the needs of the various persons, groups,
and institutions affected by the choice-of-law process. Moreover, to
argue that we will not perfect a "fail-safe" system is not to argue
that improvement is impossible. Improvements have been and are
being made. But it is essential to remember that the choices that
must be made are not between alternatives that are clearly good or
clearly bad, or between methodologies that are essentially defective
or completely satisfactory. Professors Cheatham, Reese, and Leflar
have demonstrated that a number of values are at stake in the
choice-of-law process." Some values can be advanced only by sacri-
ficing others. Some problems can be solved only by ignoring others.
In the final analysis, the acceptance of a particular methodology
usually involves a decision that some values are more important
than others and that some problems must be dealt with while others
can be tolerated.
If this is an accurate assessment of the situation, the judge,
practitioner, or law student may well ask whether the study of
choice-of-law methodologies is worthwhile. The answer must be an
emphatic yes. Scholars have been more influential in this field than
in most. Contemporary judicial opinions are replete with references
to scholarly works, and attorneys are expected to deal with contend-
ing methodologies in their briefs. Moreover, since conflicts cases
occur relatively infrequently, members of the bench and bar are not
able to devote the time to the subject that is necessary to acquire
real expertise. When they are confronted by a choice-of-law prob-
lem, they often find that the case law does not provide adequate
guidance. Not only is it difficult to find precedent to cover the
multitude of different cases that can arise, but it is also difficult to
reconcile and make use of the precedent which exists. What is
needed is a set of assumptions that will assist in determining which
facts are significant, provide a method of evaluating the relative
importance of the pertinent facts, and illuminate the issues. Given
the complexity of the subject, it is also important to develop a
method of inquiry that will break problems down into their compo-
nent parts and indicate the manner in which decisions should be
made. In short, the lawyer confronted with a choice-of-law problem
needs a model that will provide a framework for decision making.
The methodologies developed by conflicts scholars provide such
22. Cheatham and Reese, supra note 18; Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in
Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 267 (1966).
1975]
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models. In order to make an intelligent choice among the available
models and intelligent use of the model chosen, one needs to have
some knowledge of the principalschools of thought and an under-
standing of the essential differences among them.
Several theses are advanced in this article. First, it is a mistake
to assume that there is or ever will be a permanently acceptable
"fail-safe" methodology. Arguments by conflicts scholars that they
will come up with acceptable solutions if they are given more time
should be greeted with skepticism. It will help to understand what
is involved if one views the methodological debate in conflicts as
analogous to the continuing tension between such fundamental val-
ues as excellence and equality. The tension between these two val-
ues arises in many contexts and is never completely resolved. By the
same token, the tension between the competing values at stake in
the choice-of-law process will never be completely resolved. Al-
though this is not a particularly profound or original point, one can
become confused or unduly upset by a failure to keep it in mind.
Second, an eclectic approach is preferable to consistent adherence
to a particular methodology, because the importance of advancing
certain values varies with changes in the law-fact patterns in con-
flicts cases and because different methodologies emphasize different
values. Finally, it is a thesis of this article that the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws, although clearly imperfect, is the most
desirable model currently available for use as a framework for mak-
ing choice-of-law decisions. Although it would be a mistake to ac-
cept all of its recommendations, its basic approach is sound because
it recognizes that eclecticism is the proper response to the many
competing values at stake in the choice-of-law process. Wholly aside
from the theses advanced, the article is designed to serve as an
introduction to the principal competing choice-of-law methodolo-
gies. An understanding of the various alternatives and some of their
strengths and weaknesses can contribute substantially to the ability
of judges, practitioners, and law students to deal with choice-of-law
problems.
II. A SURVEY OF CHOICE-OF-LAW METHODOLOGIES
There are many ways of classifying the various methodologies
found in the legal literature. 3 Any attempt to simplify and pigeon-
23. Compare D. CAVERS, supra note 1, at 63-64; Hancock, Three Appraches to the
Choice-of-Law Problem: The Classificatory, the Functional and the Result-Selective, in
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hole will contain flaws because there will be important omissions
and categories will overlap. The richness and sophistication of the
contributions of individual scholars and schools of thought make it
difficult to summarize their methodology, and it is even more diffi-
cult to force them into a few categories. Even so, a number of useful
distinctions and methods of classification have been developed. Pro-
fessor Cavers illuminated the difference between traditional and
modern approaches when he distinguished between jurisdiction-
selecting conflicts rules and those which choose between specific
rules of law. 24 He commented on the same dichotomy in somewhat
different terms when he observed that the past forty years had been
marked by tension between the "quest for simple rules designed to
yield uniform, predictable choices of law and the effort to develop
principles capable of producing choices that would be meaningful
in terms of the interests of the parties and states involved." 2 Profes-
sor Freund succinctly distinguished between two fundamentally dif-
ferent approaches to choice-of-law when he praised an opinion by
Chief Justice Stone as "noteworthy for renouncing a geographical
test in favor of a teleological one in the choice-of-law. Not place but
purpose was decisive."2 Seeking categories that would aid in think-
ing about problems or hypotheses in the conflicts field, Professor
Hancock divided choice-of-law methodologies into three categories:
classificatory, functional, and result-selective. He used the term
"classificatory" to refer to the traditional approach of selecting the
applicable choice-of-law rule through the process of classification or
characterization. 28 He included in the functional and result-
selective categories those approaches which "proceed directly, with-
out benefit of choice-of-law rules, to a consideration of the policies
of the competing domestic laws in order to make a choice between
them. '29 Professors Reese and Rosenberg view the contemporary
conflicts debate as being between two groups. Rosenberg and Reese
have both suggested that the battle lines should be drawn between
those who believe that relatively narrow conflicts rules can be drawn
and those who would eschew any rules in favor of a method of
24. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv. 173 (1933).
25. Cavers, Re-Restating the Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on Contracts, in XXTH
CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICS LAW 349 (1961).
26. Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARv. L. REV. 1210, 1214
(1946).
27. Hancock, supra note 23, at 365.
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analysis designed to solve choice-of-law problems."0 Professor Reese
has also stated that there are two chief rival approaches at the
present time: governmental interest analysis and an approach that
he described as consideration of all the objectives.3 1 He included in
the second category the approaches of Professor Robert Leflar and
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.31
Although the distinctions adverted to above provide useful in-
sights, they do not provide as full a picture as is desirable to illus-
trate the range of modern alternatives that are available for use by
the courts. A more useful survey can be made by following the
approach taken by Professor Cavers in The Choice-of-Law Process, 3
in which Cavers described several choice-of-law methodologies and
identified each with a modern conflicts scholar or the first
Restatement.4 This article will summarize six different methodolo-
gies, which will make it possible to indicate the principal models
available for use in the analysis and solution of choice-of-law prob-
lems. In some cases, the decision to discuss a particular approach
was influenced more by the insights such a discussion would provide
than by a belief that it represents a viable methodology for use
today.
A. The First Restatement of Conflict of Laws
It is appropriate to discuss at the very outset the methodology
of the first Restatement. Although the first Restatement is in disre-
pute in scholarly circles and the extent of its influence even during
its heyday may have been exaggerated," some sections of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws borrow from it 3l and a
number of courts have shown considerable reluctance to repudiate
its doctrines.3 1 Moreover, a case can be made on functional grounds
30. Reese, Recent Developments in Torts, Choice of Law Thinking in the United States,
8 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 181, 184 (1969); Rosenberg, in Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 551, 641-42 (1968).
31. Reese, supra note 30, at 185-90.
32. Id. at 188.
33. D. CAVERS, supra note 1, chs. I and ImI.
34. Id. at 63-75.
35. Supra note 1.
36. E.g., notes 164, 165 and 169 infra.
37. See, e.g., Quandt v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Del. 1970); Bible
v. Chevron Oil Co., 308 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. La. 1969), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 984 (1972); Browning v. Shackelford, 196 So.2d 365 (Miss. 1967); Petrea v.
Ryder Tank Lines, Inc., 264 N.C. 230, 141 S.E.2d 278 (1965); Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v.
Rogers, 398 P.2d 520 (Okla. 1965), overruled, Brickner v. Gooden, 525 P.2d 632, 637 (Okla.
1974); Marmom v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), aff'd, 430
[Vol. 40
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for continued use of some of its provisions. Perhaps the most impor-
tant reason why such a discussion is appropriate is that the princi-
pal common characteristic of modern conflicts thinking is opposi-
tion to the first Restatement.3 8 One must understand the first
Restatement and some of the objections to its methodology to
understand the current situation in the choice-of-law field.
Seeking rules that would secure the same result in a particular
case in whatever forum the case might be brought, the drafters of
the first Restatement recommended a few all-embracing rules de-
signed to allocate each case to the legal system of a single state.39
The allocation is accomplished by isolating for each category of
cases a connecting factor, such as the place where the tort occurred40
or the place of contracting.' Thus a court arrives at the applicable
law in a conflicts case by deciding which category a case falls
into-tort, contract, property, etc.-and then ascertaining the state
in which the connecting factor for the category is located. In follow-
ing this method, it is unnecessary to consider the specific content
of the conflicting rules or the policies which prompted their adop-
tion.
In Hancock's terms, the first Restatement's methodology is
classificatory;42 in Professor Freund's terms, it is geographical.43 At
least on the surface, the first Restatement seemed to offer a method
that would prove easy to apply and that would achieve the uniform-
ity which its proponents considered so important. Yet scholarly op-
position to the first Restatement began developing even before its
drafters completed their work. Professor Lorenzen of Yale resigned
as an adviser after the first sections were written and began speak-
ing out against the approach taken.4 Professor Walter Wheeler
Cook joined the attack early and persisted in his efforts for years. 5
Other scholars, as well as some courts, later joined the foray, turning
the stream of criticism into a raging torrent.
Several objections to its methodology have produced the pre-
S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968).
38. D. CAVERS, supra note 1, at 12.
39. An excellent short summary of the methodology of the first Restatement can be
found in D. CAVERS, supra note 1, at 65-66.
40. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934).
41. Id. at § 332.
42. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
43. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
44. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 1 (2d ed. 1968).
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vailing consensus on the first Restatement. It is said that the multi-
tude of choice-of-law problems that arise cannot be dealt with satis-
factorily by' a few rules of broad applicability.46 It is argued, for
example, that when consideration is given to the many different
issues that arise in tort cases and the multitude of rules that have
been developed to deal with these issues it would be surprising if
socially desirable results were attained by an invariable reference to
the law of the state where the tort occurred. A broad consensus has
developed behind the notion that choice-of-law problems cannot be
handled satisfactorily by a few all-embracing rules.47 In addition,
whereas the first Restatement tended to refer all issues in a case to
the law of a single state, there is general agreement now that the
governing law should, in some cases, shift from issue to issue.48
One of the most important objections to the approach of the
first Restatement was developed by Professor Cavers.49 He used the
phrase "jurisdiction-selecting" to describe rules which locate the
state whose law is to be applied without consideration of the sub-
stantive content of that law. He pointed out that the choice-of-law
rules of the first Restatement resulted in a choice between the legal
systems of two jurisdictions rather than a choice between two
specific substantive rules of law, thus ignoring the special facts of
cases and the purposes of the conflicting laws. 0 There is now wide-
spread agreement that the content of the relevant rules should be
considered in fashioning a solution to choice-of-law problems,51 al-
though there is continuing debate on the degree of importance that
should be attached to such consideration.2 Modem scholars urge an
examination of the policies embodied in the competing rules and a
weighing of the other values at stake in a choice-of-law problem,
rather than a conceptual analysis of rules and exceptions to rules.5
It is asserted that the first Restatement's approach leaves to
chance whether the law applied is that of the state with the greatest
46. Cheatham and Reese, supra note 18, at 959; Reese, supra note 18, at 681.
47. Reese, supra note 30, at 181.
48. Id. at 182.
49. Cavers, supra note 24.
50. See id. at 192-93 for a summary of the alternative approach proposed by Professor
Cavers.
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145, comment c at 416 and Reporter's
Note (adopted 1969; pub. 1971) (hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)); Reese, supra
note 30, at 182.
52. Compare Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1233,
1235-40 (1963) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 51, at § 6, comments at 415-16.
53. See, e.g., Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 1584, 1598 (1966).
[Vol. 40
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interest and whether the result reached produces justice in the par-
ticular case. 4 This is said to be a by-product of the failure to con-
sider the content of the conflicting laws and the technique of choos-
ing the applicable law by classifying disparate types of cases into a
few all-embracing categories. Brainerd Currie sought to illustrate
what he thought was the capricious nature of this approach by
suggesting that the values of uniformity and certainty could be
achieved by a rule which governed all matters relating to tort liabil-
ity by the law of Alaska.55 In his article on married women's con-
tracts,56 Professor Currie pointed out the consequences of applying
the first Restatement methodology in all the possible variations of
a case such as Milliken v. Pratt,57 in which a married woman exe-
cuted a guaranty of her husband's credit in favor of a partnership
doing business in another state. Professor Currie assumed that one
state allowed such contracts and that the other did not, and that
the choice-of-law rule to be applied was the first Restatement's
place of contracting rule. He concluded that there were four factors
of significance in such cases: the creditor's place of business, the
married woman's domicile, the place of contracting, and the place
where the cause of action was brought. Sixteen different cases could
arise as a result of the various combinations of these four factors.
Only fourteen of these cases would produce choice-of-law problems
since one case would be purely domestic (all four factors occurring
in the forum state) and one case would be purely foreign (all four
factors occurring in the other state)." After analyzing the fourteen
possible conflicts cases, Currie concluded that consistent applica-
tion of the law of the place of contracting would produce the follow-
ing results:
• . . in six of the fourteen possible cases the interests of one state
are defeated without advancement of the interests of the other, and
that in two additional cases the interests of the forum are made to
yield to foreign interests. In only four cases are the interests of one
state advanced without impairment of a foreign interest. In two
cases the interests of the forum are given preference over foreign
interests. 9
54. D. CAVERS, supra note 1, at 77.
55. B. CumE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLCT OF LAWS 699 (1963).
56. Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U.
Cm. L. REv. 227 (1958), reprinted in B. CuRm, supra note 55, at ch. 2.
57. 125 Mass. 374 (1878).
58. Currie, supra note 56, at 232-33.
59. Id. at 246.
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In sum, if a desirable result is measured in terms of advancing the
interests of the states whose laws are potentially applicable, Currie
believed that the methodology of the first Restatement did not
reach desirable results in a high percentage of the cases that arise.
Scholars have also argued that the uniformity and certainty
claimed of the first Restatment, the grounds of its alleged strength,
have not been achieved in practice." When broad and mechanical
choice-of-law rules lead to undesirable results, the courts often find
ways of avoiding their application." In some cases courts have re-
fused to apply the otherwise applicable law of another state because
such a law was considered contrary to local public policy.62 The
traditional distinction between substance and procedure can be
manipulated so as to change the applicable law. Direct action stat-
utes, for example, have been labeled as substantive in some juris-
dictions and procedural in others.63 The process of characterizing a
problem to ascertain the applicable connecting factor is another
tool available to a court determined to avoid the consequences of a
particular choice-of-law rule. Faced with a suit in which characteri-
zation as a tort would require one result, another result can often
be achieved by characterizing the suit as one primarily involving a
contract.64 Similar opportunities exist in litigation involving mort-
gages, because the cases usually can be characterized as sounding
either in property or in contract. 5
B. The Rheinstein Method6
Professor Max Rheinstein of the University of Chicago believes
that much of the difficulty in choice-of-law arises because "writers
came to regard it as the task of conflicts law to demarcate from each
other the spheres of proper exercise of the power of sovereign states
to regulate human activities."67 He asserts that the true task of
conflicts law is to mitigate the hardships for individuals which re-
60. D. CAVERS, supra note 1, at 66.
61. Id.
62. This concept is discussed in Paulsen and Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of
Laws, 56 CoLUM. L. REv. 969 (1956).
63. See McPheeters, Choice of Laws-New Missouri Approach?, 32 Mo. L. REv. 392,
393 nn.9 & 10 (1967).
64, See, e.g., Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163
(1928).
65, See the cases collected in R. CRAMTON & D. CURmE, supra note 7, at 83-85.
66. Discussed in D. CAVERS, supra note 1, at 63, 67-69.
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sult from diversity in the rules of decision by which the conduct of
private individuals is measured.68 He recognizes that other policies
influence the shaping of conflicts rules. For example, inasmuch as
a primary goal in shaping norms of decision is the determination of
behavior, conflicts rules may be consciously shaped to facilitate a
harmonious coexistence of states pursuing different policies toward
behavior. 9 He maintains, however, that the primary purpose of
choice-of-law rules-indeed the very reason for having such
rules-is to protect the justified expectations of private individu-
als.7 1 In his view, the ideal situation would be one in which each
individual could know in advance by what state's law his conduct
will be measured.
Professor Rheinstein's emphasis on justified expectations leads
inexorably to a rejection of the approach taken by the governmental
interest analysis school of thought. Like Professor Ehrenzweig,
Rheinstein believes that the government interest school is mistaken
in its view that the purpose of conflicts law is to decide which of
competing entities of government shall prevail.7 1 Because law is a
complex of norms which are enforced by the state, it is natural to
think of law as rules of conduct addressed by the sovereign to indi-
viduals. This, in turn, makes it natural to view conflicts law as
providing guidance as to which sovereign's command shall prevail.
Rheinstein points out that it is possible to view law differently.
We can just as well say that the rules of law are commands to
certain officers of the state, telling them under what circumstances
they ought to go into action against individuals by seizing their
property, depriving them of life or liberty, or subjecting them to
other detriments.2
If law is viewed in this way, the rules of law which appear to be
addressed to judges as rules of decision can be thought of as being
addressed to individuals as rules of conduct. This makes a differ-
ence in conflicts thinking because the emphasis shifts from accom-
modating the conflicting demands of sovereigns to a more important
consideration-the parties' expectations.
68. Id. at 241.
69. Rheinstein, Book Review, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 369, 375 (1965).
70. See Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study in the Method of Case Law, 19 TUL.
L. REv. 4, 17-31 (1944), for a detailed exposition of the reasons why primary emphasis should
be given to justified expectations.
71. Rheinstein, supra note 69, at 371.
72. Id. at 373.
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The protection of justified expectations can best be accom-
plished, according to Rheinstein, by relying on narrow jurisdiction-
selecting choice-of-law rules developed to deal with specific prob-
lems. For example, where the first Restatement looked to the law
of the place of wrong for the governing law on the issue of charitable
immunity, Rheinstein suggests that the applicable law should be
that of the state of incorporation.73 If the broad categories of the first
Restatement were broken down into narrow categories based upon
specific problems, he believes that narrow rules could be developed
that would make sense in the context of the particular problem at
hand. Professor Rheinstein's approach is similar to that of the first
Restatement in the sense that it is classificatory and jurisdiction-
selecting."4 It differs, however, in the method by which the catego-
ries and rules are developed. The first Restatement was conceptu-
alistic. Its rules were thought to be derived by logical necessity from
such postulates as a right vested in one state must be protected
everywhere. 5 Rheinstein would develop rules and categories
through a functional approach, analyzing the problems raised by
narrow situations and fashioning rules based upon policy judg-
ments.
Rheinstein believes that much of contemporary American con-
flicts thinking is based upon a misconception of the classificatory
approach. The misconception, in his opinion, is the idea that the
object of the classification is the statute or rule of law in question.
Rheinstein would classify problems instead of statutes. He suggests
that this has been the long-accepted approach in European conflicts
law, especially in Germany."6
Rheinstein's ideas bear some resemblance to those of Professor
Willis Reese, the Reporter for the Restatement (Second). Both be-
lieve that one of the chief shortcomings of the first Restatement was
the attempt to fashion a few all-embracing rules rather than a num-
ber of narrow rules, and that one of the chief shortcomings of the
73. See the opinion by Rheinstein, J., in D. CAVEaS, supra note 1, at 24-26. For examples
of other rules urged by Rheinstein, see Rheinstein, supra note 70, at 30-31; Rheinstein, How
to Review a Festschrift, 11 Am. J. CoMP. L. 632, 660 (1962).
74. Rheinstein makes the following statement:
How can one classify facts or legal categories? What one can classify are either
problems to be decided, or rules of law by which to decide problems. Direction of
conflicts law toward the latter leads to chaos toward the former to workable and
stable rules of jurisdiction selection.
Rheinstein, How to Review A Festschrift, 11 Am. J. Comp. L. 632, 662 (1962).
75. Rheinstein, supra note 69, at 369.
76. Rheinstein, How to Review a Festschrift, 11 AM. J. CoMp. L. 632, 660 (1962).
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governmental interest school is a willingness to jettison all rules.7
Both Rheinstein and Reese could be said to advocate a classificatory
approach in which narrow rules are adopted after analysis of all
relevant policies. Although Professor Reese believes that justified
expectations are important, 7 he does not give this policy the promi-
nent position it has under the approach advocated by Professor
Rheinstein.
C. The Currie Method
Professor Brainerd Currie of Duke University developed an
approach to choice-of-law that has come to be known as govern-
mental interest analysis. 79 He sought to determine the applicability
of competing rules of law by ascertaining the purpose behind the
rules. Rejecting classificatory and territorial approaches, he pro-
posed an approach that in Professor Freund's terms could be consid-
ered teleological. When asked to apply the law of a state other than
the forum, he thought the court should employ the ordinary tech-
niques of construction and interpretation to ascertain whether, in
light of the policies behind the forum and foreign state rules, the
forum or foreign states have an interest in having their law applied.
States have an interest when the policies underlying their laws
would be furthered by the application of their own laws. These
policies are furthered when the legal rule in question is applied to
the kinds of cases it was intended to deal with."1 If only one state
has an interest, its law should be applied. When there is an apparent
conflict between the interests of the forum and one or more other
states, the court should first seek to avoid the conflict by a moderate
and restrained interpretation of state policies. When a conflict can-
not be avoided in this fashion, forum law should be applied. When
the forum is disinterested and two other states are interested, Currie
was more equivocal in his recommendations. " He believed, how-
ever, that this was not a crucial problem because disinterested for-
ums are relatively rare.8 3
77. See the articles by Professor Reese cited notes 18 and 30 supra.
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 51, at § 6; Cheatham and Reese, supra note
18, at 970-72.
79. For summaries of Currie's choice-of-law approach, see Currie in Comments on
Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLum. L. REV. 1233, 1242-43 (1963); Currie, Notes on Methods and
Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DuKE L.J. 171.
80. Supra note 26.
81. Comment, False Conflicts, 55 CALiF. L. REv. 74, 80 (1967).
82. See Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw & CONTMIP. PROB. 754 (1963).
83. R. CRAMTON & D. CuRRm, supra note 7, at 295.
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The search for interests through the process of construction and
interpretation is the crucial step in Professor Currie's approach. It
can be illustrated by reference to his discussion of Grant v.
McAuliffe, 4 a 1953 decision by the Supreme Court of California.
The case involved a collision between two automobiles in Arizona.
All parties in the case were from California. The driver of one car
died, and the driver and passengers in the other car sued the admin-
istrator. Under Arizona law, torts did not survive the death of the
tortfeasor. Under California law, causes of action did survive.
To Currie, the policy behind California law was not difficult to
formulate. Damages for personal injuries were thought of as com-
pensation to the injured party. Any local interests in insulating the
estate of the tortfeasor from liability were subordinate to the inter-
est in compensation of both the injured party and the public. In
light of the compensatory purpose behind California law, California
would have an interest in the application of its law when the injured
person was one toward whom that state had a governmental respon-
sibility. This would include residents and domiciliaries of California
and those present in California at the time of injury.85
Currie believed that it was more difficult to formulate the pol-
icy behind Arizona law because he thought Arizona law was proba-
bly the result of inertia rather than a considered decision. He con-
cluded, however, that the most rational policy that could be attrib-
uted to Arizona was that the living-the heirs and creditors of the
tortfeasor-should not pay for the wrongs of the dead. Recognizing
that it would complicate matters to treat Arizona policy as directed
specifically toward actual heirs and creditors, Currie resorted to a
fiction and looked for a factor other than actual connection between
the state and a protected person. He concluded that either domicile
of the deceased tortfeasor within Arizona or the administration of
property in Arizona would suffice. Thus, Arizona was thought to
have an interest in the application of its law whenever the deceased
tortfeasor was domiciled there or whenever an action was brought
in Arizona against an ancillary representative."0
Many modern scholars part company with Currie when he sug-
gests that forum law should always be applied in a "true-conflict"
situation.8" But his suggestion that an analysis of many problems
84. 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
85. The matters discussed in this paragraph are covered in B. CumE, supra note 55,
at 141-45.
86. Id. at 143-46.
87. R. CRAMTON & D. CURRIE, supra note 7, at 287.
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will reveal that only one state has an interest-what has come to be
known as the "false-conflict" case-is accepted by a broad spectrum
of commentators.88 The false-conflict concept has been *called the
"abiding cornerstone of governmental-interest analysis. ' 89
In terms of the scholarly debate over methodology, it is impor-
tant to note that Professor Currie rejected all choice-of-law rules
which were not statutory. 0 Discussing Babcock v. Jackson,9 he
said:
The question will inevitably be asked: If the governmental-interest
analysis of Babcock v. Jackson is to prevail, must all choice-of-law
problems be solved on an ad hoc basis, or will new generalizations
be possible? My response is that, for the time being at least, new
efforts to find short cuts and syntheses should be sternly discour-
aged. We are beginning to recover from a long siege of intoxication
resulting from overindulgence in generalities; for a while, at least,
total abstinence should be enforced. 2
As a corollary to his willingness to substitute ad hoc analysis for
rules, he was prepared to abandon the search for uniformity of result
irrespective of forum.9" Scholars such as Professors Reese and Rosen-
berg have suggested that this rejection of rules is the most important
factor which distinguishes governmental interest analysis from most
other contemporary methodologies. 4
D. The Cavers Method
David Cavers of Harvard advocates an approach that is similar
in many respects to Professor Currie's. The most complete state-
ment of his position was given in the 1964 Cooley Lectures at the
University of Michigan Law School. These lectures were the basis
of his 1965 book, The Choice-of-Law Process. Both Cavers and Cur-
88. See D. CAVERS, supra note 1, at 91-92; Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance for
Progress? Reflections on Reading Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process, 46 Tsx. L. REV. 141,
144 (1967). For criticism of the false-conflict concept, see Leflar, True "False Conflicts," Et
Alia, 48 BOSTON U. L. REv. 164 (1968).
89. Baade, supra note 88, at 144.
90. Although he conceded that a statutory choice-of-law rule must be followed, he was
not enthusiastic about the efficacy of such statutory rules. Baade, supra note 88, at 150-51;
Currie, Book Review, 1964 DUKE L.J. 424-25.
91. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
92. Currie, in Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLUm. L. Rv. 1233, 1241 (1963).
93. Baade, supra note 88, at 145.
94. See Reese, Choice-of-Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 315 (1972);
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rie agree that an analysis of the purpose of competing laws will often
reveal a false conflict, although Cavers seems to expect fewer solu-
tions from this type of analysis than Currie." In Cavers' view, the
difficulty in interest analysis is not in ascertaining the purpose be-
hind laws, but rather results from the fact that laws often have
multiple purposes which may point in opposite directions."
Cavers and Currie differ most sharply when interest analysis
does not reveal a false or readily avoidable conflict. Currie at this
point asserted that an interested forum should apply its own law.
Cavers, however, believes that it is the responsibility of the court:
... to seek a rule for choice of law or a principle of preference
which would either reflect relevant multistate policies or provide
the basis for a reasonable accommodation of the laws' conflicting
purposes. A principle of preference would be applicable to all cases
having the same general pattern of law and fact and would identify
a preferred result on choice-of-law grounds. If the case could not
thus be generalized, the court should state the reasons leading it
to prefer one result to the other on choice-of-law grounds. In either
case it should apply the law leading to the preferred result.
The use of a principle of preference to resolve a true conflict can be
illustrated by a hypothetical variant of Grant v. McAuliffe" posed
by Professor Cavers. Cavers suggests that a true conflict would be
presented if the facts are changed so that Arizona was the tortfea-
sor's domicile and California was the place of the accidert and the
domicile of the plaintiff.9 Arizona would have an interest in apply-
ing its law to protect the estate of its deceased domiciliary. If suit
were brought in Arizona, Currie's methodology would result in the
application of Arizona law unless the court resorted to a "moderate
and restrained interpretation."'' 0 Cavers, however, believes that the
court should apply California law, relying upon the following princi-
ple of preference:
Where the liability laws of the state of injury set a higher standard
of conduct or of financial protection against injury than do the laws
of the state where the person causing the injury has acted or had
his home, the laws of the state of injury should determine the
95. D. CAvEIs, supra note 1, at 73-74, 108.
96. Id. at 108.
97. Id. at 64.
98. 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
99. D. CAvEas, supra note 1, at 141-42.
100. See Currie, supra note 82, at 759-61.
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standard and the protection applicable to the case, at least where
the person injured was not so related to the person causing the
injury that the question should be relegated to the law governing
their relationship.' 1
Cavers asserts that this principle of perference reaches a desirable
result because Californians should not be put in jeopardy by some-
one coming into California from a state whose law provides a lower
standard of financial protection.' 2 He believes the defendant has no
basis to complain because he receives the benefits at the same time
that he assumes the burdens of the state's law.' 3
This principle illustrates what Cavers says is a territorialist
bias in his principles of preference. 104 Although he recognizes that
there are situations where it would be desirable to assume that a
citizen carries the law of his state about with him, he believes with
Judge Wyzanski that "departures from the territorial view of torts
ought not to be lightly undertaken."'' 05 Among the reasons for this
belief is the fact that the territorial organization of states and state
legal systems has created customary attitudes toward law which
would result in a feeling of having been wronged if the resulting
expectations were defeated.'0 ' In addition, he believes that the iden-
tification of an individual's rights with the laws of a single state is
attenuated by the great mobility of our citizens and the fact that
we are citizens of the United States as well as of a single state."71
Subsequent to the original statement of his principles of preference,
Cavers modified his original position on their use in cases involving
false conflicts. He originally thought they should be used only in
cases involving true conflicts. He now believes the principles of
preference can be useful in deciding whether a conflict is false or
avoidable."'
101. D. CAVERS, supra note 1, at 139.
102. Id. at 142.
103. Id. at 141. The second principle of preference deals with the situation where the
liability laws of the state in which the defendant acted and caused an injury set a lower
standard of conduct or of financial protection than the laws of the home state of the person
suffering the injury. For an interesting discussion of the application of this principle of
preference, see Cavers, Cipolla and Conflicts Justice, 9 DUQUESNE L. REv. 360 (1971).
104. D. CAVERS, supra note 1, at 134, 139. See also Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism
and Professor Cavers-The Pennsylvania Method, 9 DUQUESNE L. Rav. 373 (1971).
105. D. CAVERS, supra note 1, at 134-35, quoting from Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp.
40, 42 (D. Mass. 1949).
106. D. CAvERs, supra note 1, at 135.
107. Id. at 136.




Westbrook: Westbrook: Survey and Evaluation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1975
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Just as his 1933 article on choice-of-law 9 was a pioneering
effort, Cavers' 1965 book broke new ground. Although he has not
developed principles of preference for all or even a substantial por-
tion of the areas in which conflicts problems arise, he hopes that
those he has suggested will serve as an example of the direction in
which work should proceed." Professor Horowitz of U.C.L.A. be-
lieves that principles of preference "will surely be the form which
the choice-of-law rules of the future will take."'' Cavers' methodol-
ogy places him somewhere between the problem-oriented jurisdic-
tion selection advocated by Professor Rheinstein and the ad hoc
interest analysis of Professor Currie. If one focuses on the territorial
orientation of the principles of preference, he can see parallels to the
problem-oriented rules designed to further justified expectations
advocated by Rheinstein. If one focuses on the false-conflict analysis
and the phrasing of principles to reflect the substantive content of
competing rules, the methodological kinship with Currie stands out.
Cavers' principles of preference also place him somewhere between
the narrow rules argued for by Professors Reese and Rosenberg and
the ad hoc analysis advocated by the governmental interest school.
Although the principles of preferences are rather general, they are
rules. On the other hand, Cavers uses governmental interest analy-
sis in searching for false conflicts, and he deals expressly with the
substantive content of competing laws. Cavers' approach blends
domiciliary and territorial factors' and forges a link between geog-
raphy and teleology. Having staked out a middle ground in the
current debate, he is both praised and cricitized by those on either
side."'
One of the interesting things to watch in conflicts scholarship
will be whether Cavers himself or someone else will build on his
insights and develop a comprehensive set of principles of preference.
Another interesting issue is whether the principles of preference will
be considered a halfway point or the end product in a comprehen-
sive methodology. Professor Reese has suggested that the principles
of preference will be a useful guide pending development of more
precise rules."' Cavers, on the other hand, believes that general
109. Cavers, supra note 24.
110. D. CAVERS, supra note 1, at 136.
111. Horowitz, The Law of Choice of Law in California-A Restatement, 21 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 719, 780 (1974).
112. Felix, The Choice-of-Law Process at a Crossroads, 9 DUQUESNE L. REV. 413, 415
(1971).
113. Compare Baade, supra note 88, with Rosenberg, supra note 94.
114. Reese, supra note 94, at 324.
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principles of preference, because of their broader applicability, will
be more useful in the long run than narrow rules. He suggests that
long intervals are likely to elapse between reported decisions involv-
ing narrowly defined conflicts rules.1 5
E. Leflar's Choice-Influencing Considerations
Professor Leflar of the University of Arkansas and New York
University says that his choice-influencing considerations do not
represent a new program for choice-of-law adjudication. Instead
they provide ". . . a somewhat idealized description of the present
system .. .designed to accept substantially what happens now,
together with current trends, and to give the real reasons (which on
the whole are good reasons) for the law as it currently operates." '
Leflar's choice-influencing considerations are an effort to state in as
few words as possible the motivating reasons behind choice-of-law
rules and the actual decisions implementing these rules. He believes
that choice-of-law adjudication will work best if the true reasons for
decision are identified and discussed openly. He views the frank,
reasoned discussion of the fundamental values at stake in a case as
an alternative to the use of mechanical rules, reliance on forum
preference, or a resort to fictions to reach socially desirable results.
Although Professor Leflar makes rather modest claims on behalf of
his choice-influencing considerations, his approach to choice-of-law
can fairly be thought of as a comprehensive methodology when the
full implications of his views are understood. In addition to describ-
ing one of the major contemporary methodologies, a discussion of
his approach will serve to summarize the basic values at stake in
the contemporary debate.
Leflar maintains that the considerations which follow have al-
ways influenced common law choice-of-law decisions. 1 7
1. Predictability of Results1
This consideration is based upon two related values: (1) cases
should be decided the same way regardless of forum, and (2) parties
to a consensual transaction should be able to assume that the legal
consequences of their agreement will be the same regardless of
115. D. CAvERs, supra note 1, at 133.
116. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267,
327 (1966).
117. Id. at 282.
118. This consideration is discussed id. at 282-85.
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where disputes about the transaction occur. Pointing away from
forum shopping, this consideration emphasizes the values underly-
ing Rheinstein's emphasis on justified expectations.
2. Maintenance of Interstate and International Order"'
In cases involving international choice-of-law, this considera-
tion recognizes the claims of sovereignty. Where the choice is be-
tween the laws of states in the United States, it emphasizes the need
to further the free movement of people and goods across state lines
and to provide a fair and expeditious settlement of problems created
by the existence of our federal system. The case of Texas v. New
Jersey,2 ' involving escheat to the states of choses in action aban-
doned by their owners, is cited by Leflar as an example of a case
raising issues involving maintenance of interstate order. 1'
3. Simplification of the Judicial Task22
Although Professor Leflar recognizes that law exists for the con-
venience of society as a whole rather than courts, he points out that
this consideration is important because delays and inconvenience
resulting from undue complexity create problems for everyone-
courts, litigants, and society as a whole.
4. Advancement of the Forum's Governmental Interests'2
Leflar believes that it is legitimate for a court to seek to effec-
tuate the state interests reflected in its legislative or judge-made
law. He rejects Currie's automatic preference for the law of the
interested forum, however, believing that too often the search for
governmental interests is unreasoning because interests are equated
with any old law that may be on a state's books. He believes that a
state's governmental interests include not only its interests as a
sovereign, but also its broader concern as a repository of justice in
particular lawsuits.
5. Application of the Better Rule of Law124
Leflar says that the superiority of competing rules of law should
119. This consideration is discussed id. at 285-87.
120. 379 U.S. 674 (1965).
121. Leflar, supra note 116, at 286.
122. This consideration is discussed id. at 288-90.
123. This consideration is discussed id. at 290-95.
124. This consideration is discussed id. at 295-304.
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be evaluated ". . . in terms of socio-economic jurisprudential stan-
dards."'25 Included in this consideration is the notion of justice in
the individual case, because a choice in favor of the better of two
competing rules of law will probably approximate justice between
the litigating parties. Although he suggests that the search for the
better rule of law often will lead a court to its own lawbooks, Leflar
does not believe that an automatic preference for forum law would
either occur or be justifiable. This consideration is the one most
often challenged by other scholars. 2'
Recognizing that the choice-influencing considerations include
opposing values, Professor Leflar says that there must be frank rec-
ognition of some contradiction.2 7 This does not disturb him because
he believes such contradictions are inherent in conflicts problems.
Because the relative importance of the considerations will vary with
the issue presented, the order in which Leflar lists them is not meant
to indicate their order of priority. 28
Implicit in Leflar's approach is an assumption that most con-
flicts cases can be decided on the basis of the developed body of
choice-of-law precedent. 129 The function of the considerations is to
provide a means by which precedent can be used more thoughtfully
and can be continually reexamined and improved on a case-by-case
basis. They provide a method by which the sound portion of choice-
of-law precedent can be separated from outmoded doctrine, aberra-
tions, and mistakes.
Athough it could be argued that their generality, comprehen-
siveness, and internal inconsistency will prevent the choice-
influencing considerations from being widely used to decide specific
cases, 10 Professor Leflar has made it clear that he believes they can
be so used. 3' He has spelled this out in some detail in articles and
his treatise through discussion of actual and hypothetical cases. 12
He has conceded that the considerations will not often furnish rules
125. Id. at 296.
126. See, e.g., Cavers, supra note 108, at 213-15; Cavers, supra note 103, at 361; Maier,
Coordination of Laws in a National Federal State: An Analysis of the Writings of Elliott
Evans Cheatham, 26 VAND. L. REv. 209, 256-61 (1973).
127. Leflar, supra note 116, at 281.
128. R. LEFLAR, supra note 42, at 245.
129. Leflar, supra note 116, at 304.
130. Cf. A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWs § 122, p. 349 (1962).
131. Leflar, supra note 116, at 304-09.
132. R. LEFLAR, supra note 42, at 261-64; Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-
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of thumb; but because he assumes that the mass of existing choice-
of-law precedent will continue to serve its normal precedential func-
tion, he does not believe that rules of thumb are necessary. 3 What
he is suggesting is that a dialectic between the choice-influencing
considerations and existing choice-of-law precedent will provide a
complete and workable choice-of-law system. Leflar bolsters his
case by pointing to several judicial opinions which have expressly
relied upon the choice-influencing considerations.134
Professor Leflar was not the first scholar to seek to identify the
major considerations that should influence choice-of-law decisions.
In 1952, Professors Cheatham and Reese identified and analyzed
nine policies relevant to the solution of choice-of-law problems.135
Section 6 of the Restatement (Second) is based upon the policies
identified by Cheatham and Reese. 31 In a 1957 article, Professor
Yntema identified seventeen factors relevant to the choice-of-law
process,'37 concluding that the essential policy considerations could
be subsumed under two categories: security and comparative jus-
tice. It is accurate, however, to consider Leflar as the foremost con-
temporary exponent of choice-influencing considerations as a dis-
tinct conflicts methodology, because his formulation has been used
most often by the courts,13 and choice-influencing considerations
occupy a less exalted place in Professor Reese's approach to choice-
of-law. Whereas Leflar emphasizes the way that particular cases can
be decided by use of the considerations,139 Reese stresses the desira-
bility of using the general principles of section 6 to develop narrow
choice-of-law rules."' Despite what appear to be significant differ-
ences, however, Reese is correct in asserting that he and Leflar are
in the same camp.' Underlying both approaches is an emphasis on
a dialectic between the general policies which underlie the choice-
of-law process and more specific rules. The tension between general
and specific which arises by continuing reference back and forth is
relied upon by both Leflar and Reese to improve the law and assist
133. Leflar, supra note 116, at 304.
134. E.g., Leflar, Conflict of Laws, in 1972-73 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 12-13.
135. Cheatham and Reese, supra note 18.
136. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 51, § 6 with Cheatham and Reese,
supra note 18.
137. Yntema, The Objectives of Private International Law, 35 CAN. B. REv. 721, 734-
35 (1957).
138. Juenger, supra note 9, at 214.
139. See note 132 supra.
140. See Reese, supra note 94.
141. Reese, supra note 30, at 188.
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in the decision of litigated cases. Leflar's dialectic occurs between
the choice-influencing considerations and the existing body of pre-
cedent in the choice-of-law field. Reese's dialectic occurs between
the principles in section 6 of the Restatement (Second) and both the
specific rules included in the Restatement (Second) and the addi-
tional narrow rules which Reese hopes will develop with the passage
of time. Although Leflar emphasizes the general and Reese empha-
sizes the specific, both place their ultimate reliance on a dialectic
between the two.
Professor Leflar's advocacy of the better rule of law as a valid
choice-influencing consideration merits separate discussion for sev-
eral reasons. It is the most controversial of the considerations. The
presence of this factor in Leflar's list of considerations distinguishes
him from other scholars who have sought to identify the fundamen-
tal policies relevant to the solution of choice-of-law problems.1 2
Separate consideration also permits discussion of the role of result
selection in choice-of-law adjudication. It is not completely clear
whether Professor Leflar would accept classification of the better
rule consideration as a form of result selection. He has said that it
is result selective ". . . only in the same sense that in any noncon-
flicts case a determination of what the law is (presumably the 'bet-
ter law,' if there was argument about the law) controls the results
of litigation."'4 Although it would be possible to argue about a
definition of result selection, it seems fair to conclude that the better
rule consideration is result selective in the usual sense in which the
term is used. Leflar asserts that use of the better rule consideration
will tend to achieve a just result in particular cases, and such an
effort is a form of result selection.
Professor Hancock has said that if a classificatory approach is
rejected, we are limited in a true-conflict case to a choice between
a rule of forum preference or some form of result selection.' Result
selection can take a number of different forms. Professor Juenger
has advocated selection of the better law in tort choice-of-law
cases.15 Professor Weintraub has argued for a rule in tort cases that
would impose liability if one would be ". . . liable under the law of
any state whose interests would be advanced significantly by impo-
ing liability, unless imposition of liability would unfairly surprise
142. Compare Cheatham and Reese, supra note 18, with Yntema, supra note 137.
143. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAuF. L.
REv. 1584, 1588 (1966).
144. Hancock, supra note 23, at 378-79.
145. Juenger, supra note 9, at 233-35.
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the actor."'' The approaches of Leflar, Juenger, and Weintraub are
result selective in that they all provide a means of avoiding the
application of what are generally thought to be outmoded limita-
tions on liability. The alternative reference rules employed by the
Restatement (Second) in the areas of trusts '4 and usury '48 are
result selective in that they are designed to further the policy con-
siderations underlying what Professor Ehrenzweig has called the
rule of validation.' 4 The frequent use by courts of such "escape
devices" as characterization to reach what are thought to be just
results in particular cases"" can fairly be called result selection.
Leflar advances several reasons why courts should be influ-
enced in conflicts cases by their judgment as to which of the compet-
ing rules is the better rule.'5 ' He says that courts always have been
and always will be influenced by this consideration. That being the
case, he suggests that we will be much better off to encourage open
discussion; otherwise, courts will resort to manipulation and reli-
ance on gimmicks to accomplish the same thing. He also argues that
courts have always sought to achieve a rational, just result in the
litigation before them, and that reliance on the better rule consider-
ation will help accomplish this goal because a choice in favor of the
better rule will most often approximate justice between the litigat-
ing parties. Because a part of the search for justice in the individual
case is the effort to avoid application of anachronistic rules, Leflar
believes that one of the desirable features of the better rule consider-
ation is the greater freedom it gives courts to avoid the application
of such rules.'52 He further asserts that application of the better rule
will not defeat "justified expectations." At this point he seems to
be engaging in circular reasoning, since he appears to justify his
assertion by maintaining that expectations are not justified when
they can only be fulfilled by applying inferior law."13
Given the lack of support by courts and scholars for a wholly
146. Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems - Torts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 215,
249 (1963).
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 51, § 269(b)(ii). See also § 270, comment d at
165.
148. Id. at § 203.
149. A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 130, at § 124.
150. R. LEFLAR, supra note 44, at 216-18. See also Morse, Characterization: Shadow or
Substance, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 1027 (1949).
151. See the discussion in Leflar, supra note 116, at 295-304; and Leflar, supra note 143,
at 1587-88.
152. Leflar, supra note 116, at 299, 300.
153. Id. at 297-98.
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classificatory conflicts methodology, it seems inevitable that some
form of result selection will be part of any acceptable approach to
choice-of-law. The question is not whether, but how and how much.
The problem is one of finding a way of channeling result selection
so that it does not degenerate into wholly ad hoc decision making.
There is a significant difference between the type of result selection
which occurs because of an instinctive reaction to a particular case
and that which occurs because of a reasoned preference for a general
policy such as that of upholding contracts over a narrower policy
such as limiting interest rates. One also must distinguish between
recognition of the way things are and something advocated as an
ideal.' 54 Professor Leflar has performed a service by raising these
issues through his forthright espousal of the better rule of law con-
sideration. Whether his formulation is wholly satisfactory is a ques-
tion that will be dealt with in a subsequent section.
F. Professor Reese and the Restatement (Second)
It has been suggested that the Restatement (Second) of Con-
flict of Laws does not really represent a consistent conflicts metho-
dology.'5 5 This statement is accurate in the sense that the
Restatement (Second) does not fit neatly into one of Professor Han-
cock's three categories of classificatory, functional, or result selec-
tive."' Yet the Restatement (Second) does represent a coherent con-
ception of the choice-of-law process. The clearest notion of this con-
ception can be ascertained by reading the Restatement (Second) in
the light of the writings of its reporter, Professor Willis Reese of
Columbia."7 Not only does the Restatement (Second) represent a
coherent approach to choice-of-law, but it may in the long run prove
to be the most enduring methodology of those currently vying for
acceptance. Before describing the methodology of the Restatement
(Second), it will be necessary to summarize some of its provisions.
Section 6, entitled Choice-of-Law Principles, includes seven
factors relevant to the choice of the applicable law when there is no
forum statutory directive. These principles, which are a modified
version of the list of policies set out in a 1952 article by Professors
Cheatham and Reese,"' are similar to and are designed to serve the
154. See Cavers, supra note 108, at 215.
155. Cavers, supra note 25, at 364.
156. Hancock, supra note 23.
157. See the articles by Professor Reese cited notes 18, 30, 94 supra.
158. Cheatham and Reese, supra note 18, at 959.
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same purposes as Professor Leflar's choice-influencing considera-
tions. The major differences are the greater number of factors in
section 6 and the omission of Leflar's better rule of law considera-
tion. Section 6 can be used in determining which state's local law
will be applied to determine a particular litigated case.'59 It can also
be used in the reexamination and improvement of choice-of-law
precedent. References to section 6 can be found throughout the
Restatement (Second). For example, in the tort"'0 and contract"'
sections, we are told that the law to be applied is that of the state
which has the most significant relationship under the principles
stated in section 6. The commentary often illustrates the manner in
which the black letter rules were developed to further the policies
in section 6. For example, the first comment to section 223 asserts
that the adoption of a situs rule in cases involving conveyances of
interests in land furthers the needs of the interstate and interna-
tional systems, results in application of the law of the state of domi-
nant interest, promotes justified expectations and predictability,
and results in greater ease in the determination of the applicable
law."'2 Although writers have not often commented on the import-
ance of section 6, it seems clear that the choice-of-law approach of
the Restatement (Second) includes a strong emphasis on fashioning
rules and reexamining precedent through continuous consideration
of the policies in section 6.
Turning to the Restatement (Second)'s treatment of particular
problem areas, one finds sections that recommend specific rules and
sections that recommend broad, flexible rules which leave a great
deal to be worked out by the courts in specific cases. Professor Reese
has said that in deciding upon the treatment for a given area,
. . . one obvious goal of the Restatement Second must be not to
mislead. Care must be taken not to state rules that will prove
wrong when applied to new problems. . . . Hence, as a general
proposition, it is probably better to err on the side of a rule that
may be too fluid and uncertain in application than to take one's
chances with a precise and hard-and-fast rule that may be proved
wrong in the future."3
One can also find rules which are classificatory, rules which are
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 51, § 6, comment c at 12.
160. Id. at § 145.
161. Id. at § 188.
162. Id. at § 223, comment a at 10.
163. Reese, supra note 18, at 681.
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result selective, and rules which at least have the potential of being
applied in the manner of the governmental interest school.
The Restatement (Second)'s provisions dealing with land are
the prime examples of rules which are both definite and classifica-
tory. The law that would be applied by the courts of the situs is
looked to for the resolution of issues ranging from the validity and
effect of conveyances of interests in land 6' to the validity and effect
of wills of land.'6' There are, however, some specific exceptions to
the situs rule. '66 In other sections, one finds a combination of
jurisdiction-selecting rules and more flexible rules. Depending on
the issue, questions relating to chattels are resolved by reliance on
a fluid rule (most significant relationship under the principles of
section 6), combined with an indication that situs law will normally
be applied, 6 7 or by an outright reference to the situs."'1 Issues involv-
ing corporations are dealt with by reference to the state of incorpora-
tion,'6' by reference to the state with the most significant relation-
ship with an indication that this usually will be the state of incorpo-
ration,'70 or by reference to the state of incorporation with the quali-
fication that in unusual cases another state may have a more signifi-
cant relationship.' The different formulations appear to be de-
signed to indicate varying degrees of adherence to the state of incor-
poration rule. Presumably, one is aided in determining the likeli-
hood that an exception will be made by the way the choice-of-law
rule is phrased. The rules dealing with chattels and corporations are
examples of what one commentator has called a tendency toward
the formulation "the result is X unless it is y."11 It would be accur-
ate to refer to some of these rules as displaceable presumptions.
The sections dealing with usury73 and the validity of testamen-
tary trusts of movables"I are examples of alternative reference rules
designed to uphold the validity of transactions, if this is possible,
under one of several potentially applicable laws. In order to protect
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 51, at § 223.
165. Id. at § 239.
166. Id. at §§ 224(1), 237(2), 238(2), 240(1).
167. Id. at § 244.
168. Id. at § 246.
169. Id. at §§ 296, 298-99.
170. Id. at § 302.
171. Id. at §§ 303-04.
172. Lowenfeld, "Tempora Mutantur . . ."--Wills and Trusts In the Conflicts
Restatement, 72 CoLUM. L. REV. 382, 384 (1972).
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 51, at § 203.
174. Id. at § 269(b)(ii). See § 270, comment d at 165-67.
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the justified expectations of the parties and to make it possible for
them to predict accurately their rights and liabilities under a con-
tract,'73 section 187 provides that, within limits, the parties to a
contract are permitted to choose the applicable law. 7 ' These sec-
tions are result selective in the sense that the rule is phrased so as
to promote policies thought to be desirable. They are examples of
Restatement (Second) rules which are rather clearly linked with
some of the specific policies set forth in section 6.
Most commentators identify the Restatement (Second) with its
treatment of torts and contracts. 17  With the exception of contract
cases in which the parties have made an effective choice, the tort'
and contract 179 sections state that the applicable law is that of the
state with the most significant relationship under the principles of
section 6. This general statement is followed by a list of contacts
thought to be of particular significance. The contract and tort sec-
tions also give more specific treatment to particular issues and to
particular kinds of torts and contracts. Very often, however, the
black letter treatment of specific problems is simply a reference
back to the general rule with more specific suggestions in the com-
ments or a formulation along the lines of "the result is X unless it
is Y.,"180
The Restatement (Second) has never lacked critics.'' There
have been objections to the idea of even attempting a restatement.
Some scholars have been skeptical of the feasibility of reducing
choice-of-law principles to the Restatement format of black letter
rules followed by comments.8 2 Another objection has been a fear
that a new conflicts restatement might place the subject in a deep
freeze again before a truly satisfactory methodology could be devel-
oped. ' Some criticisms have focused on those sections of the
Restatement (Second) which retain older approaches. For example,
the sections in which a jurisdiction-selecting approach is retained
have been described as "often simply the heritage of decisions left
behind by mechanical rules of the sort from which the Restatement
175. Id. at § 187, comment e at 565.
176. Id. at § 187.
177. E.g., D. CAVERS, supra note 1, at 69-72.
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 51, at § 145.
179. Id. at 188.
180. See, e.g., id. at § 168 (charitable immunity).
181. E.g., Cavers, supra note 25; Ehrenzweig, supra note 1; Ehrenzweig, The Second
Conflicts Restatement: A Last Appeal for its Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1230 (1965).
182. D. CAVERS, supra note 1, at 11.
183. Currie, supra note 82, at 755.
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Second is seeking to escape." ' 4 The sections which depart from
tradition have evoked a mixed response. The most significant rela-
tionship test has been criticized as misleading and contrary to exist-
ing law1  and as not providing a standard by which to determine
"significance." ' Professor Cavers has suggested that the listing of
contacts in the tort and contract sections could lead to a quantita-
tive, contacts-counting approach. He argued, however, that a possi-
ble and more desirable interpretation of these sections would be
incorporation of interest analysis and principles of preference.'"
Viewing the Restatement (Second) as a whole, even those who lack
enthusiasm for the final product have not reacted with the vehem-
ence of the critics of the first Restatement. Professor Baade's reac-
tion is fairly typical:
The Second Restatement does not claim to be infallible; neither
does Professor Reese. And the critics, I am confident, will feel no
overwhelming urge this time to devote a lifetime of scholarship to
largely destructive criticism.'"
Those commentators who have praised the Restatement
(Second) have tended to be those who admire flexibility rather than
consistency and coherence of methodology. Professor Nadelmann,
for example, has said that indicating all possible angles to be con-
sidered at least has the virtue of not misleading judges and that a
grouping of contacts can help appraisal even if complete precision
can never be attained.189 Although Leflar has criticized various parts
of the Restatement (Second),'9" he has suggested that it is, on the
whole, successful in attempting to reconcile the various new ap-
proaches to choice-of-law. 91
Before attempting generalizations about the Restatement
(Second)'s methodology, it will be helpful to review some of Profes-
sor Reese's ideas. He says the recent cases show that simple, all-
embracing rules such as those advocated by the first Restatement
184. D. CAVERs, supra note 1, at 72.
185. Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Torts,
28 LAW & CONTMP. PROB. 700, 701 (1963).
186. Currie, supra note 92, at 1233.
187. D. CAvERs, supra note 1, at 69-72.
188. Baade, Marriage and Divorce in American Conflicts Law: Governmental-Interests
Analysis and the Restatement (Second), 72 CoLual. L. REV. 329, 381 (1972).
189. Nadelmann, Marginal Remarks on the New Trends in American Conflicts Law,
28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 860, 861-62 (1963).
190. Leflar, The Torts Provisions of the Restatement (Second), 72 CoLua. L. REv. 267,
269-70, 274 (1972).
191. Id. at 277.
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are increasingly unacceptable. 92 The task facing the courts in the
conflicts field, he believes, is to free themselves from the
straightjacket of a few general rules based upon notions of vested
rights, and to proceed to develop a large number of relatively narrow
rules.'93 These should be developed through analysis and application
of the policy considerations set out in section 6."11 However, since
conflicts is a relatively young field,'95 we need greater experience in
order to construct such narrow rules."' Pending the development of
large numbers of narrow rules, particular cases can be decided by
reliance on the considerations in section 6,"11 and we can experiment
with choice-of-law principles of different degrees of generality."' He
recognizes that the significant relationship rule is very general, but
views it as being useful in inducing courts to depart from concepts
such as the place of injury rule in torts."' He seems to view this and
other general formulations in the Restatement (Second) as transi-
tional statements of the law. He has said that Cavers' principles of
preference can be useful as transitional principles pending the de-
velopment of more precise rules. 8 ' Overall, the progression should
be guided by continuing reference to the considerations in section
6.
Reese views the debate over choice-of-law methodologies as in-
volving two fundamental arguments. Perhaps the most basic con-
test, in his view, is between the advocates of rules and those who
argue for an ad hoc analysis of each case.2 1 The second issue, which
is closely related to the first, is whether choice-of-law cases will be
analyzed by focusing on governmental interests or by considering all
of the objectives traditionally pursued in the choice-of-law area.
Here, he sees himself and Professor Leflar aligned against the gov-
ernmental interest school.22 He believes that the governmental in-
terest school is one-dimensional in its approach because its focus on
the interests of contending states results in neglecting important
192. Reese, supra note 18, at 681.
193. Id.; Reese, in Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Con-
flict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1251, 1254 (1963).
194. Reese, supra note 18, at 681-82.
195. Cheatham and Reese, supra note 18, at 960.
196. Reese, supra note 18, at 681.
197. Reese, supra note 94, at 322.
198. Id. at 325.
199. Reese, supra note 18, at 699.
200. Reese, supra note 94, at 324.
201. Reese, supra note 30, at 184-88.
202. Id. at 188-90.
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considerations, such as facilitating the working of the federal system
and furthering justified expectations.0 3 He also believes that gov-
ernmental interest analysis pursues aims which sometimes are im-
possible to achieve, because the purpose underlying relevant local
law rules cannot always be ascertained."'
What then is the methodology of the Restatement (Second)? Is
it simply the product of compromise and consensus that one would
expect from the political process that inevitably accompanies the
production of a restatement?25 It may be the product of a political
process, but it also seems to reflect accurately Professor Reese's
philosophy of choice-of-law. Section 6 appears to provide the best
key to understanding the Restatement (Second). As Leflar points
out, reliance on choice-influencing considerations, or choice-of-law
principles to use the phraseology of section 6, inevitably results in
contradictions. Thus it is not surprising that the Restatement
(Second) is eclectic in its choice of rules, sometimes recommending
general rules and sometimes recommending specific rules, some-
times espousing jurisdiction-selecting rules and sometimes espous-
ing some other approach. Eclecticism is the most appropriate re-
sponse to a field in which contradictions and change are inherent.
The complexity and contradictions are dealt with by continuing
reference to the fundamental policies that underlie the choice-of-
law process. The jurisdiction-selecting rules are thus not merely the
heritage of the first Restatement but the result of a deliberate choice
based upon the application of the policies identified in section 6.
This reference back and forth should, over a period of time, produce
ever more specific rules. Although much of the Restatement
(Second) is a transitional statement of the law, it provides a method
by which the transition may be accomplished. As was pointed out
in the discussion of Professor Leflar's approach, this methodology
can be described as a dialectic between the general and the specific.
Although Professor Reese probably would reject the term as sound-
ing pretentious, it would be accurate to describe the approach of
Professor Reese and the Restatement (Second) as dialectical eclecti-
cism. It would also be fair to describe the Restatement (Second) as
a model designed to encourage and accommodate change rather
than as a static finished product.
203. Id. at 186.
204. Id.
205. See Cavers, supra note 25, at 350.
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III. THE REASONS WHY A "FAIL-SAFE" CHOICE-OF-LAW
METHODOLOGY WILL NEVER BE PERFECTED
Before proceeding to evaluate the competing choice-of-law
methodologies, it will be helpful to make certain observations about
the nature of the problems dealt with in the choice-of-law field. This
will assist in an evaluation of the contending methodologies and put
the debate in perspective by giving some indication of what one can
realistically expect a methodology to contribute. It was stated ear-
lier that some scholars assert that many of the difficulties in the
conflicts field result from the relative youth of the subject.2 8 The
position advanced in this section is that it is a mistake to assume
that there will be a gradual progression toward a mature, perma-
nent, and widely accepted body of conflicts law or conflicts think-
ing. There are several reasons why choice-of-law problems are and
will continue to be among the most complex and difficult problems
in law no matter which methodology is adopted. These reasons are
closely related; indeed they overlap to a great extent. It should be
useful, however, to separate them for purposes of exposition.
A. Choice-of-Law Cases Require Courts to Reconcile the
Irreconcilable
The reconciliation of the irreconcilable, the merger of antitheses,
the synthesis of opposites, these are the great problems of the law.
Cardozo 217
Judge Cardozo was speaking of law in general when he made
this statement in a lecture at Columbia University. But choice-of-
law cases provide some of the more apt illustrations of the truth of
his statement. It is a truism worth repeating that humans differ in
their estimates of the relative importance of particular values.
When important values are in conflict and one must be preferred
over the other, intelligent, well-meaning persons will differ on what
should be done. Moreover, the choices men make in such situations
will be influenced by their institutional role. Choice-of-law prob-
lems reflect the same tensions between competing values that exist
throughout law with the added complication of conflicts between
the laws of different jurisdictions. The differences between the
methodologies reviewed earlier derive from fundamental disagree-
ments over the weight to be accorded values at stake in the choice-
of-law process.
206. Text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
207. B. CARDOZO, Paradoxes of Legal Science, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NA-
THAN CARDOZO 254 (M. Hall ed. 1947).
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An examination of the choice-influencing considerations set
forth in Leflar's work and in the Restatement (Second) will point
up some of the conflicting values involved in choice-of-law. Factors
(f) and (g) in section 6 of the Restatement (Second) emphasize
certainty, predictability, uniformity of result, and ease in the deter-
mination of the law to be applied. 28 Looking in the opposite direc-
tion are factors (b) and (c), which suggest that consideration should
be given to the relevant policies and interests of the forum and other
interested states.2 9 Also pointing away from such values as uniform-
ity is Leflar's better rule of law consideration. The tension between
these factors, each in itself an important value deserving considera-
tion, corresponds to the classic tension in the law between legal
certainty and equity. 20 On the one hand, the law should be clear,
foreseeable, and applicable uniformly. As Brandeis once said, "...
in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law
be settled than that it be settled right. 21 1 In stressing the import-
ance of uniform application, Sir John Salmond argued that men's
respect for law depends in large measure on their belief that "[j]ust
or unjust, wise or foolish, it is the same for all. .. . Yet there is
also something in human nature that rebels at sacrificing concrete
human or governmental interests to abstract goals of certainty and
uniformity, especially when we recognize that these goals often are
unattainable. Valuing good sense and decency, we want cases de-
cided in a way that strikes us as just. This means that courts must
give adequate weight to the special and unique circumstances of
each case. It also means that societal changes must be accommo-
dated by continual adjustment of the law.21 3 The authors of the first
Restatement sacrificed the values which cluster under the umbrella
of equity to those which fit under that of certainty. The functional
methodologies that dominate contemporary conflicts thinking move
sharply in the other direction. The Rheinstein approach seeks to
meet the objections to the methodology of the first Restatement
without undue sacrifice of the uniformity and predictability prom-
ised by a classificatory approach.
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 51, at § 6(f)-(g).
209. Id. at § 6(b)-(c).
210. See Neuhaus, Legal Certainty Versus Equity in the Conflict of Laws, 28 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 795 (1963).
211. Burnett v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (dissenting opinion).
212. Salmond, Introduction to SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD at lxxxi (1917).
213. See A.N. WHITEHEAD, SYMBOLISM, ITS MEANING AND EFFECT 88 (1927).
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B. Varying Conceptions of How Judges Should Discharge Their
Responsibilities
Different conceptions of the proper role of the judiciary are
reflected in choice-of-law methodologies and in the preference of
judges for particular methodologies. Not only are there differences
of opinion at any one time, but the prevailing opinion changes from
one period of history to another. When changes occur in the prevail-
ing concept of the manner in which judges should discharge their
responsibilities, some approaches to choice-of-law gain in popular-
ity and others fade. Karl Llewellyn, one of the great legal realists,
pointed out that there are period styles in legal writing. There are
times when the climate in the legal profession and the judges' con-
cept of their function result in opinions written in the "Formal
Style," where decisions seemingly are based only on formal logic
and consistency. 214 This style is appealing to judges who are reluc-
tant to expose their underlying social judgements to public critique.
It satisfies a need to have the law appear neutral, even static.215 It
is obvious that a classificatory approach to choice-of-law fits more
comfortably into this style of opinion writing. There are times, how-
ever, when judicial opinions tend to be written in the "Grand
Style," where there is an open checking of results against principle,
common sense, and decency.216 In an age when formalism and defer-
ence to symbols is viewed with suspicion, judges earn respect by
frank discussion of the actual bases of their decisions. If men no
longer believe that decisions are made through sole reliance on for-
mal conceptualism, it can be argued that the symbolic ideal of the
law's certainty is better preserved by open consideration of the poli-
cies in issue.2i1
It seems clear that the period style at present is one in which
there is little tolerance of artifice and fictions. We believe that law
should be a workable social tool, and we insist that law should be
talked about and explained in terms of functions and policies. 218 It
is to be expected that the methodology of a Cavers, a Currie, or a
Leflar, with their emphasis on the purposes which underlie laws or
on choice-influencing considerations, would appeal to contemporary
214. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 157-58 (1951).
215. See Hamilton, Judicial Process, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIL SCIENCES 450,454
(1937).
216. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 214, at 157-58.
217. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 191-95 (1960).
218. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 591-92 (1973).
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judges. It seems quite possible that the demise of the first
Restatement resulted as much from the fact that its language and
rationale were out of step with the current period style as from any
deficiencies in the way it dealt with concrete cases. After all, judges
were quite skillful in manipulating traditional concepts to achieve
acceptable results. A good example of the sensitivity of an outstand-
ing judge to such considerations is Judge Traynor's subsequent
apology in the Texas Law Review219 for his reliance on the
substance-procedure distinction in his opinion in Grant v.
McAuliffe. 20
The writings of Brainerd Currie provide another example of
how one's view of the judiciary's proper function influences one's
methodological preference. His advocacy of forum preference in a
true-conflict case derived from a strongly held belief that:
... assessment of the respective values of the competing legiti-
mate interests of two sovereign states, in order to determine which
is to prevail, is a political function of a very high order. This is a
function that should not be committed to courts in a democracy.nl
The rejection of Currie's resort to forum preference in true-conflict
cases by sympathetic scholars is in large part a result of disagree-
ment on this view of the courts' proper function in a democracy. 22
Most conflicts scholars believe that courts have long engaged in this
weighing of competing interests and that they may be more
competent than legislatures to do so. Legislatures cannot foresee all
of the situations that may arise. Courts, on the other hand, can deal
with problems on a case-by-case basis. If a solution fashioned in one
case does not appear suitable in a slightly different case, it can be
distinguished.2u
C. The Federal System
The structure of our federal system inevitably produces large
numbers of conflicts problems. We have two sets of substantive law,
state and federal, and two judicial systems in each state. For the
most part, private law is the domain of the states.24 Not only are
219. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Tax. L. Rav. 657, 670 n.35 (1959).
220. 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
221. B. CURRiE, supra note 55, at 182.
222. See D. CAvERS, supra note 1, at 113 and ch. IX.
223. Reese, supra note 193, at 1253.
224. More areas of private law are left to the states in this country than in the compara-
ble federal systems of Canada and Australia. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's
Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1945).
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fifty states generating private law, but choice-of-law rules vary from
state to state. Absent the application of the law of a state which has
no substantial connection with a case, decisions of the United States
Supreme Court leave a state free to make its own choice of the
governing law.225 It would be surprising if the appellate courts and
legislatures of the fifty states did not disagree frequently over the
policies they think will promote the welfare of their citizens, and
each such disagreement carries the potential for a conflict of laws
which must be resolved by the courts. Moreover, the growing vol-
ume and complexity of statutes and decisions have caused a con-
comitant growth in the number of conflicts between states' laws. It
is no surprise that the typical reaction of foreign observers is that
our system is far too complicated. 22 Reflecting on our legal system,
Justice Jackson said that, "We have so far as I can ascertain the
most localized and conflicting system of any country which presents
the external appearance of nationhood. ' ' 227
In some respects the situation in the United States is analogous
to that which existed in the thirteenth century when each of the
Italian city-states began developing a separate body of law. 2 s Given
the fact that the citizens of those cities did not spend all of their
time at home, it was natural that controversies arose between citi-
zens of different cities. In seeking an acceptable means of choosing
the applicable law, the statutists tried for six or seven hundred years
to eliminate differences of opinion within their ranks.29 Their lack
of success is sometimes explained by what are thought to have been
defects in their methodology. Professor Cavers has compared them
to the alchemists who sought to make gold out of other metals.2 31 It
is questionable, however, whether this is a wholly satisfactory ex-
planation of the statutists' difficulties. It is at least possible that the
presence of numerous sources of law presents intractable problems
which cannot be completely solved through resort to choice-of-law
techniques. And if six or seven centuries did not eliminate differ-
ences of opinion among the statutists, one may reasonably conclude
that differences of opinion over the proper approach to choice-of-law
225. Currie, The Constititution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the
Judicial Function, 26 U. CHt. L. REv. 9 (1958).
226. Von Mehren, Conflict of Laws in a Federal System: Some Perspectives, 18 INT. &
CoMP. LAW Q. 681, 683 (1969).
227. Jackson, supra note 224, at 18.
228. For a summary of the work of the statutists in dealing with the situation presented
in the Italian cities, see D. CAvans, supra note 1, at 1-3.
229. Id. at 2.
230. Id. at 1.
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may not disappear from our jurisprudence with the passage of time.
In sum, continuing controversy over choice-of-law problems may be
one of the inevitable consequences of living under a federal system
such as ours.
D. The Large Number of Variables Presented in Choice-of-Law
Cases
The almost infinite number of law-fact patterns that can arise
in cases raising conflicts questions makes it extremely difficult to
formulate rules of decision that will deal satisfactorily with each
case that may arise. In discussing Grant v. McAuliffe,21 Brainerd
Currie pointed out that there were at least 174 different fact situa-
tions involving the California statute on survival of tort actions that
would give rise to choice-of-law problems.21 2 All lawyers use the
technique of distinguishing cases when the facts of a case differ in
some way from precedent that would otherwise govern. Because
conflicts cases contain more variables than wholly domestic cases,
existing precedent is more apt to be distinguishable. Since conflicts
cases arise less frequently than wholly domestic cases,2 3 there are
fewer reported decisions available for guidance of the court and the
parties. Thus, in a field where a greater variety of questions can
arise, there are fewer resources of precedent upon which one can
rely.
Traditional conflicts theory dealt with this bewildering array of
possible law-fact patterns by isolating only one of the relevant fac-
tors and establishing it as the key to the applicable law. 234 It was
pointed out earlier that this tendency toward oversimplification is
considered to be one of the key shortcomings of the traditional sys-
tem. 2- Some contemporary conflicts scholars urge an approach that
would strike a balance between the few broad rules of the first
Restatement and an approach that would treat each case as unique.
It was pointed out earlier that Professor Reese has urged the necess-
ity of developing large numbers of relatively narrow rules.26 Other
scholars react to the multiplicity of cases that can arise by eschew-
ing any attempt to formulate conflicts rules and urging instead a
method of analysis which can be used to decide cases on a more or
231. 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
232. B. CURRIE, supra note 55, at 141.
233. D. CAVERS, supra note 1, at 14.
234. B. CURRIE, supra note 55, at 142.
235. Text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
236. Text accompanying notes 192-200 supra.
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less ad hoc basis.237 These scholars argue that such an approach is
the only feasible way of dealing with the tremendous variety of cases
which arise in a fashion which will give adequate weight to the
varying policies brought into play by shifting law-fact patterns. The
point that should be emphasized is that these differences in
methodology arise because of differences of opinion as to how best
to cope with the tremendous variety of problems generated by our
legal system. Everyone recognizes that the creation of jurispruden-
tial tools to deal with such complexity is very difficult. The large
number of variables makes it impossible to reconcile the demands
of certainty and equity in a manner that does not in itself create
additional problems. The choice of a methodology is in part a deci-
sion as to which problems the legal system can best cope with and
which problems are best left alone.
E. Societal Changes
Social and economic changes result in changes in the character-
istic choice-of-law problems which confront the courts during any
one period of time. Thus, even if a consensus has emerged on the
most appropriate mode of analysis for dealing with a particular set
of problems, the consensus may crumble if the accepted approach
does not work well in dealing with the new problems generated by
societal changes. Cavers has pointed out that the characteristic
choice-of-law problems of nineteenth-century America were con-
flicts involving commercial law and the flow of funds from "the
capital-rich East to the capital-poor West."" 8 He notes also that
conflicts problems were generated in the latter half of the nine-
teenth century by "the uneven emergence among the states of stat-
utes designed to remove anachronisms in the common law, such as
restraints on married women as property owners and traders, the
denial of actions for wrongful death, and the fellow-servant rule.
• . .,,230 Professor Ehrenzweig has asserted that the contemporary
ferment in conflicts law is concentrated in the area of tort conflicts
law.20 Professor Juenger agrees and suggests that the rejection of the
rule of lex loci delicti in tort cases has often been motivated by a
desire to avoid the application of noxious substantive law.24' Seen
237. Currie, supra note 92, at 1241.
238. D. CAVERS, supra note 1, at 114-15.
239. Id. at 115.
240. Ehrenzweig, supra note 1, at 378, 383, 392.
241. Juenger, supra note 9, at 224.
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in this light, Babcock v. Jackson4 2 is a product of the notorious
Ontario guest statute. The emergence of no-fault statutes is now
producing new choice-of-law problems. 243
It is true, of course, that this is a problem which exists through-
out law. Social and economic changes occur continuously; the only
variable from one age to another is the rate of change. Law must
respond to change, and this fact of life produces one of the perennial
problems of jurisprudence-the reconciliation of the claims of sta-
bility with those of progress.244 Yet this fundamental fact of legal life
has special significance in the conflicts field. The uneven response
of state courts and legislatures to societal changes provides a con-
tinuing source of conflicts problems. Although some may argue that
their methodology provides a philosophy for all seasons, it seems
more realistic to assert that the desirability of various choice-of-law
methodologies will vary with the problems being considered. Conse-
quently, a subject which would be difficult even if the characteristic
problems remained relatively constant is periodically subjected to
great stress as a result of changes in the nature of the problems
which find their way into the courts.
IV. AN EvALUATION OF THE COMPETING CHOICE-OF-LAw
METHODOLOGIES
A. General Considerations
One who approaches the writings of leading conflicts scholars
without strong preconceptions about the choice-of-law process is apt
to react in the way that the central character in Walker Percy's
novel The Moviegoer reacted to reading liberal and conservative
periodicals.245 He went to the library to read controversial periodi-
cals whenever he felt bad. Although he took great pleasure in the
attack and counterattack, he was either unable or felt no real ne-
cessity to decide which point of view was correct. He enjoyed the
debates the way a sports fan enjoys a good football game. Moreover,
the choice-of-law debate seems less important when one realizes
that intelligent judges can achieve satisfactory results with any of
the competing approaches because all of them leave maneuvering
room where wisdom and common sense can have an impact. But
scholars, practicing lawyers, and judges cannot afford to approach
242. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
243. See Kozyris, No-Fault Automobile Insurance and the Conflict of Laws-Cutting
the Gordian Knot Home-Style, 1972 DuKE L.J. 331.
244. See B. CARDOZO, SELECTED WRrnINGS, supra note 207, at 254.
245. W. PERCY, THE MOVIEGOER 95 (1961).
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the problem this way. In advising clients, writing briefs and opin-
ions, writing articles, or teaching law students, one cannot simply
throw up his hands. Methodological choices are made whether or
not one realizes it. It is best to make the choices consciously.
It has been said that the tendency in developed countries is for
conflicts specialists to refine and complicate the field to a point
where it cannot be understood by the average judge.246 Although it
is difficult to see how the choice-of-law field could be made easy, it
probably is true that scholars have a tendency to write for each other
rather than for the non-specialists. This, in turn, tends to make the
final product less comprehensible and useful for the non-specialist.
It has been common in recent years to see law review symposia in
which several scholars address themselves to a single case.4 7 After
reading each writer's analysis of the case, many practitioners and
judges probably find themselves thoroughly confused. There is little
chance that the scholars will reach a consensus on methodology in
the near future. Even if they did, changing circumstances and per-
ceptions would soon dissolve such a consensus. There is no need,
however, to await achieving a consensus before attempting to meet
the needs of the bench and bar. More work needs to be directed
toward those who do not have time to become thoroughly conversant
with the intricacies of the field."8 Scholars should periodically ask
themselves whether their proposals could be readily understood and
applied by trial judges and whether their proposals would give any
guidance to attorneys deciding whether to settle or litigate a case.
Everything else being equal, it should be considered a plus for a
particular methodology if it allows lawyers and judges to think and
talk in a manner that is natural to them. It is also a point in favor
of a particular approach if its rationale is capable of being explained
to non-lawyers and its results fulfill their normal expectations when
they are confronted with a legal problem. All of this is not to suggest
that the methodological debate should not go on; such a suggestion
would be fanciful anyway since conflicts scholars are as addicted to
this type of argument as some people are to drugs or alcohol. It
simply suggests that there should be greater sensitivity to the needs
of the non-specialist, which might cause one to be skeptical of
246. Zweigert, Some Reflections on the Sociological Dimensions of Private Interna-
tional Law or What is Justice in Conflict of Laws?, 44 CoLO. L. REv. 283, 299 (1973).
247. See, e.g., the symposia cited note 5 supra.
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suggestions that we must discourage short cuts and synthesis249 or
that we should have refrained from attempting the Restatement
(Second) .25
It is fashionable now to deprecate the factor of predictability in
law. The insights of the legal realists have combined with accelerat-
ing changes and the outpouring of legislative, administrative, and
court-made law in recent decades to cause sophisticated lawyers to
suggest that the notion of law as something which has a discoverable
structure is an illusion.251 Law is thought of as a vast ocean, a bot-
tomless pit,2- which is better understood as a process than as an end
product. This is true of legal scholarship in general, and it is even
more true of the conflicts field. In the conflicts field predictability
is said to be either unattainable or, in the case of unplanned events,
of questionable importance.53 Although it is impossible to deny the
value of such insights, it is questionable whether law can fulfill
society's expectations if the value of predictability is not given an
honored place. In conflicts, as in other fields, the ideal of predicta-
bility must be pursued even if it can never be completely attained.
The virtues of predictability are obvious in situations where careful
planning is based on assumptions as to what the law is. Even in the
case of unplanned events, the argument that predictability is not
important is subject to serious question.254 In a case involving an
accidental injury, a predictable choice-of-law rule helps a lawyer
decide whether his client should sue or settle and where to sue.255 It
reduces the time that must be devoted to legal research and writing
briefs. Decisions must be made before suit is brought, during trial,
and in deciding whether to appeal a trial court's decision. Uncer-
tainty as to the applicable law can often cause problems which are
as serious foi those involved in tort litigation as the problems asso-
ciated with planning commercial transactions. When one seeks to
teach a sophisticated understanding of the manner in which a legal
system operates, it is necessary to dwell on the difficulty inherent
in predicting what "law" will be applied in particular cases. But
when one attempts to devise a choice-of-law approach which will
249. Currie, supra note 92, at 1241.
250. Ehrenzweig, supra note 181, passim.
251. See, e.g., Bork, We Suddenly Feel that Law is Vulnerable, Dec. 1971 FORTUNE 115.
252. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 218, at 595.
253. E.g., Felix, The Choice-of-Law Process at a Crossroads, 9 DUQUESNE L. REV. 413,
418 (1971).
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serve the interests of living, breathing human beings, it is important
to place some emphasis on the factor of predictability. There are
other important values at stake in the choice-of-law process, but we
are entitled to be skeptical of any methodology which denigrates the
importance of predictability." 6
One final point is worthy of note before discussing the individ-
ual views of scholars. Although scholars are apt to stress their differ-
ences, much of their work can coexist peacefully with that of their
colleagues in the field. Similarities in some of the approaches were
pointed out earlier. 57 Combinations of the approaches of different
scholars can be productive. Synthesis and compromise do not neces-
sarily result in imprecision and uncertainty. It was suggested earlier
that the tendency of the courts has been to lump all of the modem
approaches together. 58 It is submitted that a focus on solving the
concrete problems of real people will indicate that such eclecticism
is preferable to attempts to achieve doctrinal coherence.
B. The First Restatement
The criticisms of the first Restatement were given when its
methodology was described supra. This was done because it assisted
in explaining the current situation in the conflicts field and in de-
scribing the modem approaches. After reviewing the latter, how-
ever, the shortcomings of the first Restatement seem less over-
whelming. When one views the conflicts field in perspective, it is
difficult to avoid the conclusion that inherent contradictions and
complexity will make it impossible to develop a "fail-safe" method-
ology. It follows that there will be shortcomings in any restate-
ment, any approach, any comprehensive set of proposals. This does
not mean that the first Restatement presents a viable alternative
today. As a comprehensive methodology, it is dead and cannot be
revived. It should not be revived. Its simplicity was appealing, but
experience has shown that such simplicity will not work in a federal
system such as ours. Perhaps its most important flaw was the fact
that abstract conceptualism provided its intellectual underpin-
nings.
Any modem choice-of-law methodology must be designed to
256. Id. Professor Maier makes a useful distinction between the need for predictability
and certainty for lawyers and the need for protection of the justified expectations of the
parties.
257. Text accompanying notes 77-78, 95, 111-12, 140-41 supra.
258. Text accompanying notes 7-10 supra.
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serve functional goals and explained in functional terms in order to
be acceptable. But this does not mean that a modem system should
never make use of jurisdiction-selecting rules and a classificatory
approach. There may be times when a jurisdiction-selecting rule is
the best way to serve functional goals, if functional is defined more
broadly than the governmental interests revealed by the competing
rules sought to be applied. For example, the drafters of the
Restatement (Second) may have made a wise choice when they
retained the situs rule in some situations involving real property.
The situs rule is probably the jurisdiction-selecting rule that is most
firmly entrenched in case law. Although it has been roundly criti-
cized in several excellent articles by scholars who advocate a func-
tional or interest analysis approach to choice-of-law problems,259 a
careful reading of the articles leaves one with a feeling that the
critics have exaggerated the problems associated with retaining the
situs rule and have unduly minimized the problems that would
result from its demise. A classic choice-of-law problem involving
intestate distribution of land, drawn from an article by Professor
Weintraub, will illustrate the point:
The real estate is situated in state X. It is owned in fee simple by
Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith has a settled residence in state Y, as do his
wife and three minor children. Mr. Smith dies intestate. Under the
intestacy statute of state X, the widow would take a one-third
interest in the real estate and the other two-thirds would be div-
ided equally among the children. Under Y intestacy law, however,
the widow would take a one-half interest in the realty and the other
one-half would go to the children. Should X or Y law be applied
to the intestate distribution of the X realty?26
Professor Weintraub argues for application of the law of the state
of residency by asserting that:
If a Y resident does not receive a share that Y thinks sufficient and
as a consequence becomes a public charge, it is Y and Y's citizens
who will pay the bill. If the distribution does not comport with Y's
259. The following articles were written by Moffatt Hancock: Conceptual Devices for
Avoiding the Land Taboo in Conflict of Laws: The Disadvantages of Disingenuousness, 20
STA. L. Rv. 1 (1967); Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Laws and Judgments in Real
Property Litigation: The Supreme Court and the Land Taboo, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1299 (1966);
Equitable Conversion and the Land Taboo in Conflict of Laws, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1095 (1965);
In the Parish of St. Mary leBow, in the Ward of Cheap, 16 STAN. L. Rsv. 561 (1964). See also
Weintraub, An Inquiry Into the Utility of "Situs" as a Concept in Conflicts Analysis, 52
CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1966).
260. Weintraub, supra note 259, at 17.
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ideas of fairness and the Y claimants quarrel, it is Y's peace that
is disturbed."'
It is highly unlikely that the decision as to whether to apply X or Y
law will have any effect upon whether someone becomes a public
charge or the peace is disturbed. Those who litigate the intestate
distribution of realty are not likely candidates for welfare. Many
things may influence the parties to disturb the peace, but having
X rather than Y law applied is not one of them. In the fact situation
in question, it is unrealistic to speak of governmental interests. Both
X and Y have more of an interest in having the case decided quickly
and finally than in who wins or what law is applied. Although there
are cases in which states have a real rather than fictional interest
in the application of their law in litigation involving foreign land,
the really substantial interest of the states in most cases is in pre-
serving the security of their land transactions. 6 2
In the final analysis, the normal concern should be with the
interests of people rather than of governments. And the concern
should not be solely with those people who are parties in the case
before the court. In cases involving real property, for example, there
should be concern for those persons who will engage in transactions
which are similar to the one before the court. Recognition should be
given to the interests of attorneys and their clients in the efficient
and accurate examination of titles to land and in the planning of
real estate transactions so as to avoid litigation. For every person
who litigates a conflicts case involving land there will be hundreds
who need guidance in planning real estate transactions so as to
avoid litigation.
A functional analysis should also include consideration of the
costs to courts, litigants, and society of adopting one rule or ap-
proach instead of another. If such costs are considered, some atten-
tion would have to be paid to John Frank's point that the multi-
plication of decision points will increase the burden on courts,8 3
which will in turn increase costs for everyone concerned because of
the added time and uncertainty resulting from such an increased
burden. After striking a balance between the various competing
considerations, a court might decide that the situs rule is the most
practical solution to the majority of cases involving land. It might,
on the other hand, narrow the range of cases in which the situs rule
261. Id.
262. See Rheinstein, Book Review, 8 J. PUB. LAW 551, 556 (1959).
263. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
[Vol. 40
46
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol40/iss3/1
CHOICE-OF-LAW METHODOLOGIES
is relied upon. Experience may show that principles of preference
or other techniques provide more feasible solutions in some situa-
tions. The point is that labeling a rule as jurisdiction-selecting does
not conclude the argument. Although it would be a mistake to rely
wholly on jurisdiction-selecting rules, it also would be a mistake to
reject them out of hand.
There is another factor which should be considered in evaluat-
ing the territorial emphasis of the first Restatement. In an interest-
ing article in the Duquesne Law Review, Professor Aaron Twerski
suggested that expectations play a role beyond affecting conduct. "64
It can be very disconcerting unless we can rely upon a regularity and
rhythm in life. He pointed out that although the population has
learned to live with the change that is an inevitable part of the
common law, it would be difficult to persuade people to accept the
notion that time and space elements play no role in choice of the
applicable law. Human experience indicates that these time and
space elements are part of normal expectancies. To demean these
elements in the law of conflicts is to take away some of the sense of
regularity and rhythm. He concluded by saying that those who ad-
vocate a fragmented choice-of-law theory should "reconsider normal
expectancies as an appropriate function of the law." '265
C. Rheinstein
Professor Rheinstein was certainly right when he argued against
the intellectual undergirding of the first Restatement by asserting
that choice-of-law rules must be based upon considerations of policy
rather than seemingly compelling logic. 6 And he made an enduring
contribution when he pointed out that the primary purpose of
choice-of-law rules is to protect the justified expectations of the
parties.2 7 In some ways "justified expectations" was an unfortunate
choice of words to indicate !he point he was making. Taken literally
these words could be said to refer only to those situations where
advance planning is undertaken before one acts. Many have used
the words in this sense and, as a consequence, have asserted that
the concept of justified expectations has no relevance in cases in-
volving unplanned events such as automobile accidents. But Rhein-
264. Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism and Professor Cavers-The Pennsylvania
Method, 9 DUQUESNE L. REv. 373, 381-83 (1972).
265. Id. at 382.
266. Rheinstein, supra note 70, at 17.
267. See text accompanying notes 67-72 supra.
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stein used the term in a broader sense than this; the idea underlying
justified expectations is the desirability of mitigating for individuals
the hardships created by legal diversity. This needs to be done in
all kinds of cases. By insisting that the purpose of conflicts law is
to mitigate the hardships for individuals resulting from differences
in the laws of various states, he put the emphasis where it should
be-on people rather than governments. In making such an asser-
tion, one does not have to reject Professor Cavers' point that rules
of private law usually represent norms for the ordering of behav-
ior. 8 Cavers went on to say:
Even in the case of laws with the most limited public objectives, I
think it reasonable to ascribe to the state a desire to have the
purposes of its laws effectuated in situations where this would
appear to advance those purposes, absent countervailing consider-
ations."'0
Although Professor Cavers has indicated a willingness to dispense
with the term "interest,''270 he still believes that a consideration of
the purposes underlying laws will prove more useful in conflicts
cases than consideration of justified expectations.Y It is at this
point that a persuasive case can be made for Professor Rheinstein's
emphasis on justified expectations. It is clear that an interested
forum would have the power to decide a case so as to effectuate the
purposes of its state's laws. It is not so clear that this should be the
approach taken in a case involving a conflicts problem. In a wholly
domestic case it would be improper not to construe a statute so as
to carry out its purpose. When a case involves facts which bring the
laws of other states into the picture and there is no statutorily man-
dated choice-of-law, an entirely different problem is presented. In
the usual case the state legislature never thought of the situation
presented to the court and to speak of "purposes" in the interstate
context is to indulge in fictions. If the legislature had considered the
conflicts implications of the substantive rule in question, it would
have weighed an entirely different set of factors. It is sensible in
such a situation for a court to use the freedom given to it by ac-
cepted notions of the role of the judiciary and current constitutional
doctrines to fashion a result designed to mitigate the hardships for
268. D. CAvEss, supra note 1, at 100.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 69.
[Vol. 40
48
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol40/iss3/1
CHOICE-OF-LAW METHODOLOGIES
individuals which result from legal diversity. If the domestic rule in
question was developed by the judiciary, the case for consideration
of justified expectations is even stronger. Courts should realize that
conflicts cases present problems and raise expectations for those
involved which are often wholly different than the domestic case.
There is every justification, therefore, for the development of a body
of law which responds to the needs of those confronted by the special
problems created by legal diversity. This emphasis on mitigating
hardships for individuals will not always provide an obvious answer
to specific questions, but every choice-of-law rule and every decision
should be examined to see if they are consistent with the values that
inhere in the concept of justified expectations. Professor Rheinstein
correctly pointed out that this emphasis on mitigating hardship is
the underlying basis of the search for uniformity regardless of
forum . 12 The quest for uniformity, in turn, has been the chief moti-
vating force in the development of a separate body of law known as
conflict of laws.273
Although the emphasis on justified expectations should play a
major role in any comprehensive conflicts methodology, it is not
enough in itself. A comprehensive methodology should seek to em-
compass the full range of factors covered in section 6 of the
Restatement (Second) and Professor Leflar's choice-influencing
considerations, perhaps giving justified expectations a more promi-
nent role than is given by the Restatement (Second) or Leflar. Al-
though the suggestion that we classify problems and develop narrow
rules provides a useful key to resolving troublesome issues, this is
not, in itself, enough to provide the bench and bar with a workable
model for decision making in conflicts cases. The range and com-
plexity of choice-of-law problems in the United States requires a
model that is both more comprehensive and more eclectic.
D. Currie
No conflicts scholar in recent years has written more brilliantly
than Brainerd Currie. His articles provide a rare sort of pleasure for
the conflicts enthusiast. In the final analysis, however, his approach
does not provide a methodology that will work in a satisfactory
manner across the full range of conflicts problems. His advocacy of
forum preference has not and will not achieve broad acceptance
because more is involved in the choice-of-law process than choosing
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between conflicting governmental interests as Currie defines them,
and because most scholars and judges do not share Professor Cur-
rie's belief that it is inappropriate for judges to decide between
conflicting state interestsY4 Currie argued that this task should be
performed by legislatures because courts are not qualified, and for
courts to do so would be undemocratic. It was suggested previously
that courts are better qualified than legislatures to deal with choice-
of-law problemsY5 Currie himself has indicated grave misgivings
about legislative efforts in the conflicts field.2 6 Legislative absten-
tion from the conflicts field seems to amount to a concession that
the courts should handle these problems. Currie's advocacy of a
moderate and restrained interpretation and rational altruism 277 by
courts implies that courts are capable of discharging responsibilities
which are fully as difficult as those involved in choosing between
governmental interests.7 8 His argument that this function should
not be committed to courts in a democracy denies large parts of the
legal tradition of this country, for this and similar functions have
been performed by courts throughout our history. It cannot be de-
nied that courts frequently are motivated by a parochial preference
for forum law. This instinctive preference has value as long as it is
not elevated to the status of an automatic preference. In the final
analysis, however, the widespread shared acceptance of the ideal of
disinterested justice will prevent most courts from frankly embrac-
ing an approach which calls for an automatic forum preference
whenever the forum has an interest.
The best argument for a forum preference approach is that it
achieves greater certainty than an approach which requires the
court to choose between conflicting state interests. If it is argued
that one will not know the applicable law until after the case is filed,
a proponent of forum preference could reply that at least it will be
possible to ascertain the applicable law without having to take the
case all the way to the state's highest court. Predictability after the
case is filed is preferable to no predictability at all. The simpler task
of ascertaining whether the forum has an interest would reduce the
274. See, e.g., D. CAvERs, supra note 1, at 93-96, 113; Hill, Governmental Interest and
the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 463, 474-81 (1960);
Traynor, supra note 219, at 675.
275. Text accompanying notes 221-23 supra.
276. Currie, supra note 225, at 84 n.334.
277. Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J.
171, 180.
278. Peterson, Weighing Contacts in Conflicts Cases: The Handmaiden Axiom, 9
DUQUESNE L. REv. 436, 443-44 (1971).
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burden on trial courts and attorneys and might encourage settle-
ments. This argument is most persuasive in the area of tort choice-
of-law. A proponent of the Currie approach could maintain with
some justification that a period of confusion appears to be an inevi-
table consequence of a rejection of lex loci deliciti and that a rule
of forum preference is the quickest and simplest way to bring some
order out of the confusion. This argument would be more acceptable
if forum preference were viewed as a transitional device and were
strictly limited to the area of tort choice-of-law.
Professor Currie's rejection of all choice-of-law rules in favor of
ad hoc analysis is more objectionable than his advocacy of forum
preference. He referred to rules as short cuts and syntheses and
spoke of them in a deprecatory mannerY9 The formulation of rules,
however, is an inevitable part of the judicial process. Lawyers are a
rule-making breed.211 It is true that excessive reliance on generalities
can encourage imprecise analysis. A total rejection of rules, on the
other hand, would place an intolerable burden on the bench and the
bar, both'intellectually and in terms of the time needed to deal with
conflicts problems. In commenting on Professor Currie's concession
that the traditional system works tolerably well at the hands of
"sensitive and ingenious" judges, Professor Hill pointed out that
Currie would replace it with a different system without considera-
tion of how the new system would operate under judges who are less
than sensitive and ingenious.28' A crucial question is whether Cur-
rie's insistence on ad hoc analysis would be acceptable in the law
offices and judicial chambers of the country. The Currie methodol-
ogy is not likely to become widely adopted if large numbers of law-
yers and judges would find it more difficult to work with than the
alternative methodologies, or would tend to fall into error more
often when engaged in ad hoc analysis. Perhaps the answer to this
question lies with the new generation of law students, because those
who have had a good course in conflicts in recent years will have
been exposed to Currie's views before obtaining too many precon-
ceptions. 282 It is significant that only a few of the scholars who share
with Professor Currie an emphasis on the ordinary process of con-
279. Text accompanying note 92 supra.
280. Compare Leflar, supra note 190, at 273, with Rosenberg, in Symposium on the
Value of Principled Preferences, 49 TEx. L. REv. 229 (1971).
281. Hill, supra note 274, at 473.
282. R. CAm~WON & D. CuaaiE, supra note 7, one of the leading conflicts casebooks, is
dedicated to Brainerd Currie and presents his views in a sympathetic manner, while adding
new insights of the editors.
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struction and interpretation are ready to join him in rejecting all
choice-of-law rules. 83
Although Professor Currie's advocacy of automatic preference
for the interested forum and insistence on total abstinence from
reliance on rules have not been widely accepted, his assertion that
choice-of-law problems should be dealt with by a search for govern-
mental interests through the process of construction and interpreta-
tion has been favorably received.14 The idea that such an analysis
often will reveal a false conflict has been especially appealing.215 The
efficacy of the technique of governmental interest analysis is one of
the crucial issues in the contemporary choice-of-law debate. It is
submitted that Professor Currie's version of governmental interest
analysis suffers from several flaws. It was suggested previously that
this approach will be difficult to use because laws often have multi-
ple purposes which may point in opposite directions."6 This multi-
plicity of purpose, the lack of reliable sources of information on state
legislative purpose, and the protean nature of the concept of interest
combine to make interest analysis fully as subject to manipulation
as traditional choice-of-law rules. Moreover, many of the interests
relied upon in interest analysis are every bit as fictitious as the more
abstract fictions that were popular in the past. What may be going
on is simply an exchange of one set of fictions for another, dressed
up in language that is more acceptable to the contemporary audi-
ence. Even if one assumes that interests can be discovered with
some precision, a serious flaw still exists. When the legislature has
expressed a clear domestic policy determination, we are told that
this interest cannot be sacrificed even where there is no clue as to
whether the policy was intended to be applied to multi-state
cases.27 This assertion results from an unduly narrow concept of
state interests. Professor Hill has pointed out that Currie in effect
argues that courts should give effect to specific, limited interests but
should not try to give effect to long-term interests.21 Among the
283. D. CAVERS, supra note 1 at 94.
284. See authorities cited note 88 supra; Hill, supra note 278, at n. 8; Kramer, Interests
and Policy Clashes in Conflict of Laws, 13 RUTGERS L. REv. 523 (1959); Traynor, supra note
219, at 667-75; Kelso, The Process of Analyzing Choice of Law Problems, 1959 WASH. U. L.Q.
37; Leflar, Conflict of Laws (Annual Survey of American Law), 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 62, 63-66
(1960).
285. Authorities cited note 88 supra.
286. Text accompanying note 96 supra. The difficulty of ascertaining governmental
interests can be illustrated by comparing Baade, supra note 188, with Seidelson, Interest
Analysis and Divorce Actions, 21 BurAwO L. REv. 315 (1972).
287. Peterson, supra note 278, at 441.
288. Hill, supra note 274, at 485.
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long-term interests most vigorously rejected by Currie are those
which accrue because of uniformity of outcome."' Professor Hill's
long-term interests parallel the factors identified by Leflar and sec-
tion 6 of the Restatement (Second). Professor Hill argued persua-
sively that these long-term interests are fully as important to the
states as the more limited interests which Currie says should be
advanced.9" By stressing the narrowness of Currie's concept of state
interests, Professor Hill also illustrated the illusory quality of the
false-conflict concept.29 ' He suggested that uniformity of result in
particular classes of cases is a valid interest. However, consideration
of this interest is omitted from the false-conflict analysis. Thus a
case can be said to involve a false conflict only because an artifi-
cially restricted concept of governmental interest is used.
Viewed as a whole, Professor Currie's conflicts philosophy is
basically a philosophy of surrender. He was willing to give up the
effort to achieve the values traditionally associated with conflicts
law because he believed that a rational system designed to further
these values was "impossible of accomplishment with the resources
which are available." '292 He wanted to lead us out of the wilderness
by persuading us to pursue more modest goals. Given the ease with
which interest analysis can be manipulated, there is reason to be-
lieve that even these more modest goals would not be realized in a
way that would satisfy Professor Currie. There is room in an eclectic
approach to choice-of-law for use of the techniques of interest analy-
sis, but interest analysis does not provide a complete answer to the
problems presented by legal diversity.
E. Cavers
Professor Cavers has not developed principles of preference for
every category of case that can arise. Even those principles which
have been developed presumably will be modified as they are exam-
ined and used by courts and scholars. Professor Rosenberg is right
when he suggests that the principles of preference tend to neglect
values such as coordination of the multi-state system and easing the
burdens on courts and litigants caught up in a case with multi-state
elements. 2 3 He is also persuasive when he suggests that in devising
choice-of-law rules we need not confine ourselves to principles of
289. Id. at 488.
290. Id. at 488-90.
291. Id, at 490-91.
292. Currie, supra note 56, at 263.
293. Rosenberg, supra note 280, at 234.
1975]
53
Westbrook: Westbrook: Survey and Evaluation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1975
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
preference but should choose the type of rule which best promotes
the various values at stake in the particular problem area in ques-
tion. 94 Emphasizing flexibility, Rosenberg believes that an eclectic
approach is preferable to a system built solely around principles of
preference.295 But any modem conflicts methodology should cer-
tainly make full use of Professor Cavers' insights and his principles
of preference. The greatest strength of the Cavers approach lies in
the fact that he seeks to further the purposes and policies underlying
state law without exposing lawyers and litigants to the expense and
uncertainty which accompany a case-by-case analysis of govern-
mental interests. He does continue to rely in some cases on a false-
conflict analysis, and the same criticism can be made of his ap-
proach in this respect that was made of Professor Currie's ap-
proach. 9 ' This criticism is less important in Professor Cavers' case,
however, because the logic of his principles of preference is leading
him away from too great a reliance on the false-conflict analysis.297
F. Leflar
A satisfactory choice-of-law methodology should identify or
provide a means of identifying the values which it is designed to
advance. Professor Leflar's discussion of the choice-influencing con-
siderations does this well. The continuous testing and reexamina-
tion of choice-of-law rules in light of these considerations would
provide a workable means of correcting errors and keeping the rules
up to date. Section 6 of the Restatement (Second) would serve the
same purposes equally well. Although Professor Leflar believes that
the choice-influencing considerations are more usable because they
are fewer in number, 99 it is at least arguable that the greater detail
of section 6 would make it a preferable tool for the testing and
reexamination of rules.
Professor Leflar has demonstrated that the considerations can
be used to decide specific cases,99 a proposition that is bolstered by
use of the considerations in several decided cases."' It is question-
able, however, whether the choice-influencing considerations pro-
vide a satisfactory method of deciding cases in other than excep-
294. Id. at 234-35.
295. Id.
296. See text accompanying notes 284-91 supra.
297. See text accompanying note 108 supra.
298. R. LEFLAR, supra note 44, at 243-44.
299. Leflar, supra note 116, at 304-09.
300. Supra note 134r.
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tional situations. The values of predictability, uniformity, and ease
in determining the applicable law would be furthered more effec-
tively by principles of preference or some other type of rule. The
very flexibility and comprehensiveness which enable the considera-
tions to deal effectively with the full range of values which arise in
conflicts cases make it unlikely that they will prove consistently
workable in deciding cases.
The most questionable of the choice-influencing considerations
is the one which encourages application of the better rule of law.
Professor Leflar is correct in saying that this factor does influence
courts. Professor Cavers is right, however, when he argues that al-
though the tendency should be recognized, it should not be encour-
aged. 01 Use of the better rule in deciding which law should apply
misconceives the nature of the task confronting the court. When a
court is asked to apply some law other than forum law, its responsi-
bility is to decide whether the facts relate the parties or the contro-
versy to another state's law.32 If a court decides such a question on
the basis of its preference for one of the competing laws, it is either
assuming the role of a super appellate court, evading its responsibil-
ities to correct obsolete or erroneous forum judge-made law, or as-
suming powers which should be left to its own state legislature. It
is assuming the role of a super appellate court when it applies forum
law because it concludes that it is superior to the law of another
state."3 The determination whether the law of the sister state should
be overruled or modified is properly the function of that state's
highest court, and it is both presumptuous and inappropriate for the
forum court to negate that law because of a belief that it is inferior.
The forum court is evading its responsibility when it applies another
state's law because of a belief that it is superior to forum judge-
made law. The forum court, if it is the highest appellate court in
the state, has the responsibility to overrule or modify outdated or
clearly erroneous judicial rules. Reliance on the looseness in the
joints of the conflict-of-laws system in such a situation obscures the
basic issue before the court. The court is assuming powers which
should be left to its state legislature if it applies another state's law
because of a belief that it is superior to a forum statute. Although
the court must concern itself with questions of interpretation and
constitutionality, it is the responsibility of the legislature to deter-
301. Cavers, supra note 108, at 215.
302. Id.
303. Seidelson, Comment on Cipolla v. Shaposka, 9 DUQUESNE L. REv. 423, 432 (1971).
1975]
55
Westbrook: Westbrook: Survey and Evaluation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1975
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
mine whether statutes should be modified or repealed. It is true, of
course, that the discretion inherent in any conflicts system would
permit a court to avoid the application of noxious law in each of
these situations and explain its decision on choice-of-law grounds.
Professor Leflar would argue that in such a situation it would be
preferable for a court to state honestly the basis for its decision. But
when one realizes that encouraging such candor promotes confusion
as to the proper responsibility of a court in a case raising choice-of-
law issues, the argument for candor loses some of its force. As Pro-
fessor Maier has said, ". . . encouraging a court to be honest in
making poor choice-of-law policy judgements does not improve the
quality of the judgement made. '3 4 A final problem with the better
rule of law consideration is the danger that it might serve as a
substitute for analysis, because it often is easier to decide whether
one of the competing rules is superior than to engage in the difficult
analysis necessary to decide a case on choice-of-law grounds."5
Rejection of the better rule of law consideration does not imply
rejection of all forms of result selection or advocacy of a wholly
classificatory approach to choice-of-law. The Restatement
(Second)'s treatment of usury"' is an example of result selection
based upon the preference of one policy over another when the pre-
ferred policy is considered more important and the degree of en-
croachment upon the other policy is slight. One does not have to
approve of this particular rule to accept it as an example of how
result selection can be channeled so as to avoid encouragement of
purely ad hoc decision making.
Viewed in perspective, Professor Leflar's choice-influencing
considerations are an interesting reflection of his scholarly career in
the conflicts field. It is difficult to think of another scholar who has
been so open to the ideas of others and who has done as good a job
in clearly describing the thinking of others. This is one of the great
strengths of his treatise. It is one of the salient characteristics of the
many annual surveys on developments in the conflicts field which
he has written for the Annual Survey of American Law published
by the New York University School of Law. Reading his work, one
has the impression that this is the way that a wise man who has kept
up with the cases and scholarly developments might react to what
he has learned. His comprehensive approach shows an awareness of
304. Maier, supra note 126, at 259.
305. Id. at 256.
306. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 51, at § 203.
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the many factors that have been influential. Its flexibility reflects
the lesson of experience that it would be a mistake to try to force
the field into a rigid mold and that a "fail-safe" system will never
be perfected. Its chief value is that it forces one to focus on the
fundamental values at stake in the choice-of-law process.
G. Professor Reese and the Restatement (Second)
It is possible to criticize many aspects of the Restatement
(Second). As the product of consensus and compromise, it lacks the
brilliance and style of the writings of Currie and Cavers. Many of
its black letter rules could be criticized."' Professor Reese can be
faulted for his unduly optimistic view that many of the problems in
the conflicts field are a result of the youth of the subject.0 ' It is
unlikely that we ever will or should develop narrow rules to cover
all the problems in the field. With respect to some problems, Profes-
sor Cavers seems correct in arguing for rules of greater generality.3 9
We do need to experiment with rules of varying degrees of general-
ity, as Professor Reese suggests," ' but such experimentation proba-
bly will indicate that, although the progression in some areas will
be toward ever narrower rules, in other areas it will be preferable to
rely on more general rules.
Everything considered, however, the Restatement (Second) is
the most workable and useful single tool which is currently available
to the bench and the bar. It is comprehensive, flexible, and eclectic.
These traits are necessary in dealing with the complexity and in-
transigence of the problems in the choice-of-law field. Models that
are too logically tight cannot adequately cope with the variety of
questions generated by our federal system. Although the
Restatement (Second) has been criticized as discouraging the crea-
tive development of the law on a case-by-case basis,' this criticism
fails to take into account the fact that the continuing dialectic man-
dated by section 6312 is the best intellectual tool available to correct
and update the law. The emphasis on developing rules and contin-
ually distinguishing and reexamining such rules comes closer than
307. See, e.g., Leflar, supra note 190, at 269, 274; Lowenfeld, supra note 172, at 384-86.
308. Compare text accompanying notes 18-19, supra, with Section HI of this article,
supra.
309. D. CAVERS, supra note 1, at 132-33.
310. Reese, supra note 94, at 322.
311. Sedler, The Contracts Provisions of the Restatement (Second): An Analysis and a
Critique, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 279, 285 (1972).
312. Text accompanying notes 140, 205 supra.
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the other approaches to speaking a language that is familiar and
natural for the non-specialist members of the legal profession. It
comes closer than the other approaches to serving the needs of the
non-lawyer in a situation with multi-state elements because its
comprehensiveness, flexibility, and eclecticism come closer than the
others to serving the full range of values which touch upon the
interests of non-lawyers. The methodology of the Restatement
(Second) is fully capable of being used to accomplish the crucial
task urged by Professor Rheinstein-the mitigation of hardships for
individuals caused by the diversity of state laws. No lawyer or judge
should have to rely solely on one book or treatise in the conflicts
field, but if such a choice had to be made, the Restatement (Second)
should be chosen.
V. CONCLUSION
The preceding review of the contemporary choice-of-law debate
has led to an endorsement of the Restatement (Second)'s methodol-
ogy and a questioning of some of the implicit and explicit assump-
tions on which certain positions are based. Some of the participants
in the current debate assume that the situation in the conflicts field
will improve with the passage of time. There is reason to believe,
however, that the task facing those who work in the choice-of-law
field is analogous to the myth of Sisyphus. Just as Sisyphus' stone
rolled down the hill whenever he neared the top, even if a consensus
should develop in the conflicts field, something eventually will hap-
pen to destroy the consensus or make many accepted solutions un-
acceptable. There is a continuing need to develop and modify solu-
tions to particular types of problems. Permanent solutions to prob-
lems are more likely to come through the elimination of diversity
than through improvements in choice-of-law methodology. It has
been suggested, for example, that Congress should abolish guest
statute defenses and death-damage ceilings in cases arising out of
interstate transportation accidents.3 13 Yet if a "fail-safe" system or
a permanent solution is unattainable, conflict-of-laws as a field of
study is no less important. Each generation of judges and conflicts
scholars has the responsibility of fashioning workable solutions in
the context of their time that will mitigate the hardships for individ-
uals resulting from a multiplicity of potentially applicable law. An
undue concentration on governmental interests tends to obscure
this fundamental responsibility.
313. Rosenberg, supra note 280, at 234.
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It is widely assumed that most of the problems in the conflicts
field result from fundamental flaws in traditional thinking and in
the reasoning and methodology of the first Restatement. There is a
widespread belief that things will be better once we rid ourselves of
these pernicious influences. A related assumption is that any reli-
ance on a rule or technique found in the first Restatement is auto-
matically suspect. The tendency in scholarly debate is to assume
that one has scored a telling point simply by showing that a particu-
lar rule or idea has roots in the first Restatement or traditional
conflicts thinking. Things are not that simple. The problems in the
choice-of-law field arise from more fundamental causes than any
defects in traditional thinking. Moreover, when weight is accorded
the values of uniformity, predictability, and ease in determining the
applicable law, some traditional ideas may hold up better under a
policy-oriented evaluation than modern ideas. Rather than being a
plea for the resurrection of the first Restatement, this is an argu-
ment that the debate on solutions to particular choice-of-law prob-
lems should not be conducted by attaching labels. Although the
battle against the first Restatement as a whole is over, this fact
alone does not prove that particular rules espoused in that docu-
ment are unworkable today.
Some evaluations of competing methodologies are based upon
an assumption that internal doctrinal consistency is a mark of supe-
riority. To the contrary, it is more realistic to assert that the com-
plexity, variety, and change that characterize the choice-of-law field
call for an eclectic approach. An insistence upon methodological
consistency may result in an intellectual straightjacket comparable
to the one created by the vested rights notions in the first
Restatement. Methodological consistency is not any more likely to
achieve uniformity and predictability than an eclectic approach.
Uniformity and predictability will come closer to being realized
when the courts are persuaded that they are values worth promoting
in the choice-of-law field. If concrete problems are isolated and
subjected to a policy-oriented analysis, it seems probable that this
will show that different types of problems call for different kinds of
choice-of-law rules. Acceptance of an eclectic approach means that
a court need not adopt a classificatory, functional, or result-
selective methodology as the approach to take in all choice-of-law
cases. Instead, the court's responsibility is to break the choice-of-
law field down into a number of problem areas and, guided by the
considerations identified in section 6 of the Restatement (Second)
and Professor Leflar, make a deliberate choice among the types of
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rules available. Consideration should be given to principles of pref-
erence, alternative-reference rules, jurisdiction-selecting rules, dis-
placeable presumptions, and others. Consideration should also be
given to Professor von Mehren's suggestion that special substantive
rules, different from the domestic rules of any of the concerned
states, should be developed for certain multi-state situations. 1 4
The kind of methodology needed today is one which relies upon
rules rather than ad hoc analysis, is eclectic in its approach, and
provides a mechanism by which the rules that have been developed
can be continually tested and updated. The Restatement (Second)
satisfies these criteria better than the other methodologies which
have been considered. The adoption of the Restatement (Second)
approach does not imply commitment to a particular set of black
letter rules. Professor Reese's endorsement of Chief Judge Fuld's
concurring opinion in Tooker v. Lopee13 is a good indication that the
Restatement (Second) methodology is open to the development of
rules which are not contained in the Restatement itself. Professor
Reese referred to Chief Judge Fuld's formulation of principles for
guest statute cases as "a model which it is hoped other courts will
emulate. '" 316 Adoption of the Restatement (Second) approach means
that there is a commitment to the development of choice-of-law
rules through the dialectic mandated by section 6. It also means
there is a commitment to experimentation with rules of varying
types and varying degrees of generality. Whatever approach is taken
to the solution of particular problem areas, there should be a con-
tinuing effort to think in terms of the people affected by choice-of-
law concepts. Both courts and scholars should continually ask how
a particular decision or rule will affect the businessmen, consumers,
litigants, practicing attorneys, trial judges, and others who will be
affected by or who will have to apply the decision or rule. Scholars
sometimes seem to neglect such considerations as a result of their
absorption in the debate over methodology.
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Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARv. L. REV. 347 (1974).
315. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
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[Vol. 40
60
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol40/iss3/1
